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INTRODUCTION

Most people place great value on their liberty. In fact, some would
rather die than live without it.' The quest for liberty has been one of the
strongest currents in modem political and intellectual history and has
been a driving force in the founding of the United States as well as
economic and political developments in Europe and around the world.2
This Article takes the advancement of liberty seriously, both as an3
important part of American and European culture, history, and politics

and as an objective in the ongoing work of reforming and restructuring
the law and legal systems across the globe. The examples focus on
United States law, 4 but the same issues and problems pervade other legal
systems as well. The analysis does not presume that liberty is the only
social value of importance, but it focuses on the relationship between
law and liberty to put the connections between the two in the clearest
light possible. The great advantage of focusing the analysis on liberty for
its own sake is that the reader does not have to accept idiosyncratic value
judgments. Almost everyone values liberty and cares about the ways in
which the law may advance or impede it.
In spite of the importance that most people attach to liberty, it is not
always clear what we mean when we refer to it. Scholars have debated
the relative importance of different kinds of liberty and have drawn
useful distinctions, for example, between the freedom from evils, such as
1. The most famous pronouncement was no doubt by Patrick Henry, who ended a speech to
the Virginia Convention on March 23, 1775, with the emphatic declaration, "[G]ive me liberty or
give me death!" See I WILLIAM WIRT HENRY, PATRICK HENRY: LIFE, CORRESPONDENCE AND
SPEECHES 266 (1969).
2. The role that the quest for liberty plays in the American imagination is reflected in the
titles of numerous books. See, e.g., I ERIC FONER, GIVE ME LIBERTY!: AN AMERICAN HISTORY
(3d ed. 2010); JOY HAKIM ET AL., FREEDOM: A HISTORY OF US (2002); and KENNETH BRIDGES,
FREEDOM IN AMERICA (2007). Slavery was an abomination against liberty, but even the history of
slavery has been cast in many books as a struggle for liberty. See, e.g., JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN &
EVELYN HIGGINBOTHAM, FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM: A HISTORY OF AFRICAN AMERICANS (9th
ed. 2010); JULIUS LESTER, FROM SLAVE SHIP TO FREEDOM ROAD (1999); and JAMES OAKES,
FREEDOM NATIONAL: THE DESTRUCTION OF SLAVERY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1861-1865 (2014).
3. The role that the pervasive yearning for freedom played in the development of western
culture and politics is thoroughly documented in I ORLANDO PATTERSON, FREEDOM: FREEDOM IN
THE MAKING OF WESTERN CULTURE (1991).
4. The "American experiment" has been portrayed as an experiment in the application of the
classical liberal thought of the Age of Enlightenment to the founding of a nation. See, e.g.,
ADRIENNE KOCH, THE AMERICAN ENLIGHTENMENT: THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN EXPERIMENT
AND A FREE SOCIETY (1965). References to the "American experiment" date to I ALEXIS DE
TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 25 (1900), who wrote, "In that land the great experiment
was to be made, by civilized man, of the attempt to construct society upon a new basis; and it was
there, for the first time, that theories hitherto unknown, or deemed impracticable, were to exhibit a
spectacle for which the world had not been prepared by the history of the past."
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physical force or coercion exerted by others, and the freedom to act,
such as the freedom to speak one's mind or worship the religion of one's
choice. 5 Nonetheless, there is no consensus about the freedoms that are
essential to liberty, and so its meaning remains nebulous and elusive. To
focus the analysis, therefore, liberty is defined to require 1) that
individuals 6 be as free as possible from the exercise of coercion 7 by
others, including the State, 8 except to the extent that they have truly and
voluntarily assented to the coercion, and 2) that individuals have a
sphere of personal autonomy and privacy within which they are free
from intrusions by the State or others to think what they will, say what9
they want, associate with whomever they like, and be whoever they are.
While the appropriate scope of autonomy and privacy rights may be
debatable, few, if any, would dispute that they are integral to liberty.
There is a wide range of literature on the relationship between law
and liberty, but most of it focuses specifically on the relationship
between public law and liberty.' 0 Public law is usually defined as the
branch of the law that addresses relationships between levels of

5. See, in particular, ISAIAH BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 146 (1969). See also Ian
Carter, Positive and Negative Liberty, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, (Mar. 5, 2012)
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr20l2/entries/liberty-positive-negative/.

6. The term "individual" is used in this Article exclusively to mean natural persons, as
opposed to corporate persons.
7. The word "coercion" is also necessarily nebulous and ill-defined. The word is used here
in the sense that FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 20-21 (1960) defined it,
which is to mean "such control of the environment or circumstances of a person by another that, in
order to avoid greater evil, he is forced to act not according to a coherent plan of his own but to
serve the ends of another."
8. When a capital "S" is used in the word "State," it is meant to indicate a reference to
government generally, not a state govemment within the United States.
9. The first part of this definition of liberty is from HAYEK, supra note 7, at II (liberty is
"that condition of men in which coercion of some by others is reduced as much as is
possible .... ). The second part of the definition is derived from the importance accorded by
libertarian writers to individuals having personal spheres of autonomy and privacy. Consider, for
example, Hayek's further observations that "[c]oercion... cannot be altogether avoided because the
only way to prevent it is by the threat of coercion. Free society has met this problem by conferring
the monopoly of coercion on the [S]tate and by attempting to limit this power of the [SItate ....
This is possible only by the [S]tate's protecting known private spheres... " Id. at 21. See also
RANDY E. BARNETT, THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY: JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW 14 (1998)
("Given the various problems that arise when humans live and act in society with others, the
classical liberal answer ... was that each person needed a 'space' over which he or she has sole
jurisdiction or liberty to act and within which no one else may rightfully interfere.") (emphasis
omitted).
10. See, e.g., FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY (1973); RICHARD A.
EPSTEIN, THE CLASSICAL LIBERAL CONSTITUTION: THE UNCERTAIN QUEST
GOVERNMENT (2014); and BARNETT, supranote 9.

FOR LIMITED

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[49:01

government and relationships between governments and individuals. "
Scholars have no doubt focused on public law and liberty because there
are so many important public law questions that bear on the liberties of
individuals-for example, the powers of governments to regulate
speech, engage in searches and seizures of persons and property
incidental to an arrest, or to regulate the right to bear arms.
This Article, on the other hand, focuses on the relationship between
private law and liberty. Private law is usually defined as the branch of
law that addresses the relationships between individuals, rather than
between individuals and their governments. 12 There is already a
significant amount of literature addressing the relationships between
private law and liberty, but much of it focuses on the justifications for
private law and the role of the government in facilitating and regulating
private legal transactions. 13 Most of it has very little to say about specific
private law doctrines. 14 In contrast, this Article explores the ways in
which specific private law doctrines may advance or impede liberty.
One of the lynchpins in the analysis is the simple and
noncontroversial observation that when courts enforce private legal
rights they exercise the powers of State coercion against the parties
subject to their enforcements.1 5 Courts' decisions about whether to
enforce claims under private laws therefore have direct consequences for
liberty. The courts thus play an important role in advancing liberty
through their enforcement or non-enforcement of private legal claims
under well-known contract and property doctrines. Unfortunately, there
are some important ways in which courts may also undermine liberty
through their enforcement or non-enforcement of some private legal
I.
Jonathan Law & Elizabeth A. Martin, Public Law, OXFORD DICTIONARY OF LAW (7th
ed.
2014),
available
at
http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/
9780199551248.001.0001/acref-9780199551248-e-3146?rskey=ws5Gap&result-3315
(last visited
Aug. 10, 2014).
12. Jonathan Law & Elizabeth A. Martin, Private Law, OXFORD DICTIONARY OF LAW (7th
ed.
2014),
available
at
http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/
9780199551248.001.0001/acref-9780199551248-e-3032?rskey=6jZntO&result=3201
(last visited
Aug. 10, 2014).
13. For example, Friedrich Hayek, Richard Epstein, and Randy Barnett have all addressed
aspects of the relationship between private law and liberty, but with a much larger purpose and
broader focus that placed the relationship within the context of public law issues. See HAYEK, supra
note 7; EPSTEIN, supra note 10; and BARNETT, supra note 9.
14.

Eric T. Freyfogle, Property and Liberty, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 75, 78-79 (2010)

critiques libertarian theories of property on the grounds that they are consequentialist and not rooted
in a conception of individual rights. This Article concurs with Freyfogle, but seeks to explicate the
relationship between private law doctrines and liberty recognizing, as he does, that the connections
are highly nuanced.
15.

See infra Part I1.
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claims under some other well-known contract and property doctrines.
Another one of the lynchpins of the analysis is the equally simple
and noncontroversial observation that corporate persons are created
under state laws for the benefit of their owners and/or other interested
parties and, presumably, for the good of society. Both for-profit and nonprofit corporations enjoy rights and privileges under the law, including,
for example, the right to sue and be sued, limited liability, and
preferential tax treatment; they are, in that sense, State-sponsored
entities. 16 In return for the rights and privileges they enjoy, they are
often subjected to restrictions and regulations that do not apply to natural
persons-for example, a for-profit corporation may have reporting
obligations under securities regulations and a non-profit corporation may
not be allowed to participate in political campaigns. Although they are
private legal entities, because of the rights and privileges they enjoy
under state and federal law, the State is complicit whenever a
corporation impinges upon the liberties of natural persons. In particular,
the State is complicit whenever a corporation impinges upon an
individual's liberty by intruding into her sphere of personal autonomy
and privacy. The concern may be mitigated when the corporation is forprofit, subject to the discipline of the market, but it is exacerbated when
the corporation is non-profit that receives significant tax exemptions as a
public charity. i
This Article argues that private laws are no less important to liberty
than public laws and that if private laws are constructed and applied
appropriately they will advance liberty, but if not, they may actually
facilitate the exercise of coercion and, therefore, undermine liberty. To
that end, this Article illustrates some of the ways in which certain wellknown private law doctrines may advance liberty.' 8 But it also expresses
concerns about the application of some other private law doctrines. One
of the concerns lies in the fear that private laws may sometimes allow
some individuals and corporations to use the courts, and implicitly,
therefore, the power of State coercion, to impinge upon the liberty of
other individuals. This concern is explicated using private land use
restrictions as an example. Another concern is that private laws may
allow corporations to use their rights and privileges to intrude into the

16. See infra Part 11.
17. See infra Part 11.
18. This Article does not intend to imply that private law doctrines were devised to advance
liberty, although further investigation of the matter may be justified; it merely observes the role of
private law doctrines in advancing liberty and suggests ways in which private law doctrines might
be revised to advance liberty still further.
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spheres of personal autonomy and privacy that are essential to the liberty
of natural persons. This concern is explicated using lifestyle covenants
and morals clauses as an example.
Part II of this Article discusses the relationships between liberty,
the State, and private law and elaborates on some of the presumptions of
the analysis. Part III focuses on the relationships between liberty and
specific property law doctrines. It uses examples from human rights, the
first in time, first in right rule, findings and adverse possession, and
eminent domain to illustrate some of the ways in which property
doctrines may advance or undermine liberty, depending on whether the
doctrines are appropriately constructed and applied. It also raises
concerns about the ways in which property law may systematically
undermine liberty, using courts' enforcements of some private land-use
restrictions as an example. Part IV focuses on the relationships between
liberty and specific contract law doctrines. It uses examples from the
parol evidence rule, the unconscionability doctrine, and the
impracticability doctrine to illustrate the ways in which contract
doctrines may advance or undermine liberty, depending on whether the
doctrines are appropriately constructed and applied. It also raises
concerns about the ways in which contract law may systematically
undermine liberty, using, as an example, the practices of some Statesponsored, non-profit corporations that use lifestyle covenants and
morals clauses in their employment contracts to intrude into their
employees' spheres of personal autonomy and privacy. Part V offers
some conclusions.
II. LIBERTY, THE STATE, AND PRIVATE LAW
Liberty is both dependent upon and limited by the State. The State
protects individuals from the coercion of others, but paradoxically, it
must exercise coercion itself in doing so.' 9 For example, an individual is
protected (to some degree) from acts of physical violence against her
person in part because other individuals know that such acts are
prohibited by criminal laws and will be subject to punishment by the
State. The use of force or the threat of the use of force by individuals
against other individuals is discouraged by the State's threat of the use of
force against anyone who perpetrates acts of violence against others.20
The State thus necessarily relies on coercion to protect individuals from
the coercion of others. If the social objective was to maximize individual
19.
20.

HAYEK, supra note 7, at 21.

Id.
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liberty, the State's use of coercion would be justified only if it reduced
by individuals against other
the amount of coercion exercised
21
individuals by a greater amount.
This does not necessarily mean that a free society should rely
exclusively on the power -of the State to deter coercion. There might be
less coercion overall if individuals-or groups of individuals-assumed
some of the responsibility for protecting themselves. For example, a
neighborhood association might be able to prevent many crimes against
property and persons simply by exercising some vigilance without the
need to involve the police and courts. 2 That would lessen the burden on
the criminal justice system, while at the same time diminishing the
exercise of coercion overall. In fact, almost every society relies to some
extent on the ability of its citizens to protect themselves against
transgressors, whether it is through simple vigilance, a credible threat of
resistance against the use of force, or the threat of the use of force in
self-defense or even retaliation. 3 Nonetheless, every developed society
still relies primarily on the State to deter coercion, and this inevitably
raises concerns about the abuses of State power.
A ConstitutionMitigates Concern RegardingState Abuse of Its Powers
of Coercion
The reliance on the State to deter coercion raises the possibility that
the State's powers of coercion might be abused. A constitution that
constrains the exercise of the State's coercive powers helps to mitigate
those concerns. There are a variety of ways in which a constitution
might protect individual liberties against encroachments by the State.
21.

It is not clear whether anyone believes that the State's sole objective should be to

maximize individual liberty. Libertarian scholars have usually focused on minimizing the size and
role of the State. See, e.g., ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 26 (1974). Even
Nozick concedes, however, that "[wlhatever its virtues, it appears clear that the minimal [S]tate is

no utopia." Id. at 297.
22.

Robert Nozick, for example, discusses the ways in which individuals in the state of nature

might form "protective associations." Id. at 12-15. He argues, however, that even a "dominant
protective association"-a protective association that might emerge from a state of anarchy to bring
a semblance of order to a particular geographical area-would fall short of fulfilling the
requirements of a State. Id. at 15-25.
23. The use of force by individuals against other individuals raises nuanced problems. It may,
for example, undermine the State's monopoly of the use of force. HAYEK, supra note 7, at 21. But
the use of force by individuals arguably does not undermine the monopoly of the State over the use

of force if the State, through its laws, delegates to individuals the right to use force in self-defense.
Randy Barnett provides a detailed justification of the right of self-defense. See BARNETr, supra note
9, at 184-91. The use of force by individuals in retaliation for others' use of force against them is

more problematic.
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For example, a constitution arguably should separate the powers of
government to provide appropriate checks and balances between and
within its branches and constrain any one branch from impinging on
liberties too far.24 If the executive branch has a veto over new
legislation, for example, this limits the power of the legislature to enact
statutes that might impinge on citizens' liberties. If the legislature is a
bicameral one, this means that any new legislation must have a coalition
of support in two chambers rather than one, again limiting the26power of
the legislature to enact statutes that might impinge on liberties.
A constitution arguably should also place hard constraints on the
nature of the coercion that may be used by the State. For example, a
constitution might constrain the State from imposing cruel and unusual
punishments, even though such punishments might have a strong enough
deterrent effect to reduce the amount of coercion exercised in society
overall. 27 The State's use of such extreme punishments might offend
such basic human dignities that the reduction in other forms of coercion
might not justify the increased deterrent effect. 28 To give another
example, a constitution might constrain the State from conducting some
searches and seizures, even though the searches and seizures might help
to detect and deter the use of coercion by some citizens against others so
much that they would reduce the amount of coercion overall. Some
searches and seizures might intrude into individuals' privacy so much
that the reduction in the exercise
of coercion overall might not justify the
29
impingement on their liberty.
Ultimately, of course, there are considerations other than ensuring
that individuals are free from coercion that must also be factored in any
calculus of a just society. Thus, many constitutional provisions in the
United States and other nations have less relevance to protecting liberties
than they do to advancing other core social values. These core social
24.

BARNETT, supra note 9, at 253-54. See also ROBERT D. COOTER, THE STRATEGIC

CONSTITUTION 215-39 (2000).

25. COOTER, supra note 24, at 215-23.
26. Id. at 223-25.
27. Barnett goes so far as to argue against using any punishments as deterrents to committing
crimes. BARNETT, supra note 9, at 216-37. He argues that the deterrence effect might be illusory,
and that it is, in any case, immoral. One of his concerns is that innocent people will always be
wrongfully subjected to punishments, and the severity of the punishments necessary to provide
deterrence to others exacerbates the injustice. Id. at 225-33.
28. As Justice Brennan wrote, "[T]he extreme severity of a punishment makes it degrading to
the dignity of human beings." Furman v. Ga., 408 U.S. 238, 272 (1972).
29. As Justice Frankfurter wrote, "The security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by
the police ... is basic to a free society. It is therefore implicit in 'the concept of ordered
liberty'...." Wolfv. Colo., 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949).
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values often reflect the cultural importance of fundamental human
dignities such as the right to equal protection of the laws or the right to
due process in the administration of justice. Thus, the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment militates against the State
exercising its coercive powers unequally,3 ° and the due process clause of
the Fifth Amendment provides procedural safeguards to militate against
unfair incarcerations. 3 1 The protections and rights afforded by such
constitutional provisions do not necessarily diminish the amount of
coercion exercised in a society overall-they might actually increase
it-but they are obviously vested with great social importance and, in
that sense, transcend the need for social order.
B. Justificationsfor PrivateLaws in Free Society
The need for public laws that constrain State actors is so widely
accepted that it is virtually taken for granted. Considerably less attention
has been devoted to the role of the State in the creation and enforcement
of private laws. Of course, some libertarian scholars have gone to great
pains to explain why private laws are justified in a free society at all. In
fact, the libertarian justifications for having a State-enforced system of
private law are far from obvious. One obvious argument is that property
and contract laws help to reduce coercion by preventing private disputes
between individuals from escalating into conflicts that involve the use of
force or the threat of force between the disputants. But that argument is
less than fully persuasive. In theory, at least, the State could protect the
rights of its citizens to only their own persons.3 2 In other words, all
property could be communal, and the State could decline to enforce any
private agreements.33 Everyone would thus have rights to use all land
30.
Although the Supreme Court rarely applied the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment until Brown v. Board of Education, 347 US. 483 (1954), it has since then frequently

used the Equal Protection Clause to combat "invidious discrimination and... [safeguard]
fundamental rights." ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 668
(3d ed. 2006).
31.
The Bill of Rights provides many protections against unfair incarcerations.
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 30, at 566. The United States Supreme Court has stated that "the interest

of being free from physical detention by one's own government" is "the most elemental of liberty
interests." Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004).
32.
Richard Epstein, for example, recognized the potential limitations of minimalist State

libertarian arguments when he observed "A system of liberty may well give each person rights over
his or her own person, but it does not in and of itself do much to assign ownership rights over things
in the external world." RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SKEPTICISM AND FREEDOM: A MODERN CASE FOR
CLASSICAL LIBERALISM 38 (2003). This concurs with Robert Nozick's view that "the minimal

[S]tate is no utopia." NOZICK, supra note 21, at 297.
33.

Communal property fights would entail that everyone had the right to use the property
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and chattels, but no one would have the right to exclude others from the
use of land or chattels or to use the courts to enforce private agreements.
A nation without a system of private law would probably best
resemble some traditional hunting and gathering societies. While it
might be peaceful and largely free from the exercise of coercion, it
probably would not provide a good foundation for the material
prosperity or advancement of its citizens. 34 It is perhaps not surprising
therefore that some libertarian justifications for private law appear to rest
on utilitarian arguments,35 such as the argument that private law
facilitates cooperation and mutually gainful transactions or the argument
that it maximizes the value of all property holdings by individuals within
a society. 36 Indeed, there is widespread agreement that private property
rights and contract law provide important incentives for investments in
land, new technologies, and new methods of production, not to mention
the incentive for greater work effort and productivity. 37 While economic
progress might not directly reduce the amount of coercion exercised in a
society, it might significantly increase the value that individuals derive
from the liberty and freedoms that they have.
Other libertarian justifications for having a system of private law
rely on non-consequentialist arguments. 38 Private law concepts have a
strong appeal to those who accept the basic tenets of natural rights and
natural law theory. 39 In some cases, natural rights justifications for
private law overlap with consequentialist ones. 40 Indeed, some scholars
but no one had the right to exclude others from its use. In other words, individuals would have
property rights, but not private property rights. If the State declined to define and enforce contract
laws, individuals could still make private agreements with one another, but they could not rely on

the State to enforce their agreements.
34. The notion that hunting and gathering societies were prosperous and afforded ample
leisure may be a myth. In fact, the notion that they were generally peaceful may be a myth too. See
Noble

or

Savage,

THE

ECONOMIST,

Dec.

19,

2007,

available

at

http://www.economist.com/node/10278703.
35. See generally FREYFOGLE, supra note 14.
36. See, e.g., RICHARD EPSTEIN, DESIGN FOR LIBERTY: PRIVATE PROPERTY, PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION, AND THE RULE OF LAW 79 (2011) ("the key challenge for the legal system is to

identify the set of consistent property uses that maximizes the value of the holdings of all
individuals within the group .... ). HAYEK, supra note 7, at 61, however, sounded a warning about
the limitations of consequentialist arguments: "Those who believe that all useful institutions are
deliberate contrivances and who cannot conceive of anything serving a human purpose that has not
been consciously designed are almost of necessity enemies of freedom."
37. This is such a basic postulate of economics that is accepted by economists of almost all
schools of thought.
38. BARNETT, supra note 9, at 4-26 discusses natural rights, natural law, and utilitarian

methods of analyzing the law.
39.

See, e.g., id.

40.

Thus, for example, Randy Barnett purports to provide a natural rights justification for the
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simply seem to presume that private property rights attach to individuals
as naturally as the rights they have in their own persons. The intuitive
appeal of property and contracts might make the need to justify a system
of private law appear unimportant, but it would be a mistake to presume
the need for a system of private law since the justification for having a
system of private law arguably provides the basis for evaluating the
private laws that we have. This Article presumes that the purpose of the
State is to advance liberty. Thus, the question that it seeks to answer is
how should private laws be devised and applied if the objective is to
advance liberty?
C. The State's Role in Enforcing PrivateLaws
It is helpful to begin by clarifying the role of the State in the
enforcement of private laws. In most developed countries, the dual
4
principles of party autonomy and party responsibility apply. ' Thus,
individual members of a society are generally free to dispose of their
property as they wish and enter into whatever agreements they like; thus,
they may create their own private legal rights and obligations, but they
are also responsible for asserting their own private legal rights and
defending themselves against others who might attempt to hold them to
legal obligations they dispute. Ultimately, however, courts enforce
42
private legal rights and obligations, and courts are State actors. When a
court enforces a private property right or a contractual obligation it does
43
so with the full force of the State's coercive powers behind it. Anyone
structure of private law that is only indirectly consequentialist. Id. at 23.
See, e.g., Stefan Grundmann, Information, Party Autonomy and Economic Agents in
41.
European ContractLaw, 39 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 269, 270-72 (2002).
42. This is a statement of fact, not a statement about United States law. As CHEMERINSKY,

supra note 30, at 527 observed, "[T]here seems little doubt that judges are government actors and
that judicial remedies are state action." Nonetheless, the United States Supreme Court has generally
limited the definition of State action under the State action doctrine to acts undertaken by the
executive and legislative branches. See id. at 507-27. Thus, actions undertaken by the judicial

branch, including court enforcements of private legal rights, are generally not considered State acts
under the State action doctrine. Id. The most important exception is Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1,

14 (1948), in which the United States Supreme Court held that "action of state courts and judicial
officers in their official capacities is to be regarded as action of the state within the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment." Shelley, however, was an exceptional case involving a challenge against
racially restrictive covenants. The Supreme Court has not followed Shelley in other cases and has,
therefore, generally not treated other court actions in other cases as State action. CHEMERINSKY,
supra note 30, at 528.
43. This is not a new observation. For example, in the wake of Shelley v. Kraemer some
scholars argued that all judicial enforcements of private legal obligations should be treated as State
action. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: NotesJbr a Revised Opinion, l10 U. PA. L.
REV. 473 (1962). Those arguments were rebutted by counters that the Equal Protection Clause of
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who declines to respect a court's injunction can be held in contempt and
subjected to an escalating series of State-imposed penalties, even
imprisonment; and anyone who declines to pay a money judgment can
have her property subjected to an execution and levy or her wages
garnished. 4 State coercion is thus the bedrock of any system of private
law.
It is important to emphasize that this is not an argument against the
State action doctrine. Under the State action doctrine, individuals have
constitutional protections against only State actions, not against actions
of other private individuals. 45 The argument that courts' enforcements of
private legal rights are a form of State action is not an argument that
individuals should have constitutional protections against actions of
other private individuals. It is merely an argument that when courts
provide individuals with a remedy for a violation of their private legal
rights by another individual the courts are engaging in State action; it is
not an argument that courts engage in State action when they decline to
provide individuals with a remedy for an alleged violation of their legal
rights by another individual. 46 When a court declines to enforce a private
legal right it does not take any action at all, let alone State action.47 In
fact, it is important to remember that a court's decision not to provide a
remedy for an alleged violation of a private legal right is not tantamount
to the court's--or the State's-approval of anyone's actions. 48 An
the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to apply only against state governments and not to
regulate the behavior of private individuals. See, e.g., Jesse H. Choper, Thoughts on State Action:
The "Government Function " and "Power Theory" Approaches, 3 WASH. U. L. REV. 757, 762
(1979). The analysis in this Article, however, is directed at the relationship between private law and
liberty. The judicial enforcement of private legal obligations is an exercise of State coercion, and
one way of disciplining that exercise of State coercion would be by expanding the scope of State
action under the State action doctrine.
44. 1 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION 12-18 (2d ed.
1993).
45. CHEMERINSKY, supranote 30, at 507.
46. Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 503, 514-16, 521-25
(1985) argued that courts' failure to provide a legal remedy for a violation of an alleged private
legal right should constitute State action. Since this would make private individuals liable to other
private individuals for violating their constitutional fights, it would effectively abolish the
distinction between State action and the actions of private individuals. But when a court declines to
enforce a private legal right or provide any other remedy for an alleged violation of a private legal
right, it does not take any action at all in the sense that is meant here.
47. This equates a court's actions with its provision of remedies. A court that declines to
provide a remedy thus refrains from taking action. Obviously, one could counter that a court's
decision not to provide a remedy is also a court action. But that would be tantamount to arguing that
not taking an action is an action too.
48. Scott E. Sundby, Is Abandoning State Action Asking Too Much of the Constitution?, 17
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 139, 140 (1989).
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individual's private actions could be morally reprehensible and even
harmful to other individuals and yet not provide others with a right to a
legal remedy.49
The distinction between courts' actions and their decisions not to
act is an important one because courts' enforcements of private legal
rights involve the exercise of the State's power of coercion while courts'
decisions not to enforce private legal rights do not. If the applicable
definition of State action under the State action doctrine was expanded
to include courts' enforcements of private legal rights but not to include
courts' decisions not to enforce private legal rights, courts would be
prevented from enforcing private legal rights when doing so would
violate the constitutional constraints on State actions against individuals.
However, this would not allow individuals to make constitutional claims
against other individuals. In other words, an individual would be unable
to have a court enforce a racially restrictive covenant against his
neighbor, but, absent some restriction against flying flags in general, his
neighbors could not prevent him from flying a Confederate flag,
regardless of how morally reprehensible they-and the courts-might
think it was to fly one. State coercion would be used only to protect
liberty, not to impede it.
That is not to say that this is going to happen anytime soon.
Constitutional doctrines usually evolve gradually, and sometimes not at
all.5 ° The State action doctrine has many critics, but it also has many
supporters, 51 and it is unlikely that the Supreme Court will broaden the
applicable definition of State action under the State action doctrine any
time soon. While that may be regrettable, it does not diminish the most
important point, which is that courts' enforcements of private legal
rights involve the exercise of the State's power of coercion and that they,
therefore, have important implications for liberty. Courts' decisions not
to enforce private legal rights do not involve the exercise of the State's
power of coercion, and they therefore do not have any direct
implications for liberty.
This is important because, if the primary purpose of the State is to
advance liberty, and if liberty is advanced by reducing the exercise of

49. For example, a homeowner might fly a Confederate flag over his house. The flag might
be offensive to many others, yet, absent some private land-use restriction on flying such a flag, the
neighbors would have no private legal right to a remedy. That hardly implies that flying a
Confederate flag is condoned by either the courts or the State.
50. As CHEMERINSKY, supra note 30, at 7 observed, the purpose of a constitution is to
entrench important social values in a way that will make it very difficult for them to change rapidly.
51. Sundby, supra note 48, at 139-44.
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coercion, then courts' decisions to enforce private legal rights require
more justification than their decisions not to enforce private legal rights.
It is therefore not enough to provide a sweeping justification for a
system of private law overall.5 2 What is needed is a justification of the
specific private law doctrines that authorize courts to enforce particular
private legal rights. What is also needed is an understanding of when
courts' enforcements of private legal rights might actually interfere with
about how legislatures or courts could
liberty and an understanding
53
problems.
the
rectify
D. Private Law-Individuals and Corporations
Of course, not all private transactions are between individuals-that
is, natural persons-and other individuals. Some private transactions are
between individuals and corporations and others are between
corporations and other corporations. Corporations are created under state
laws. 54 They are, in that sense, State-sponsored entities. Moreover, they
enjoy rights and privileges that provide benefits to their stakeholders. In
fact, that is why they are formed. For example, organizing a business as
a for-profit corporation provides the shareholders with the protections of
limited liability. 5 5 It may also offer them the advantages of transferable
ownership shares, capital gains tax rates as opposed to income tax rates,
and the alleviation of agency problems. 56 A non-profit corporation has
no shareholders, but it does have stakeholders. Its stakeholders are
initially those who form the corporation, and subsequently may include
its officers, senior employees, and major donors. 57 A non-profit
corporation usually benefits from sweeping tax exemptions, since it
usually pays no income, property or sales taxes.58
52. Libertarian scholars have tended to focus more on justifying a system of private law than
on analyzing the role of specific private law doctrines in advancing or limiting liberty. See, e.g.,
HAYEK, supra note 7; BARNETT, supra note 9; and NOZICK, supra note 21.
53. This is not to suggest that we should look to the State for solutions to all our social
problems. The problems here are a consequence of State action-court enforcements of private law
doctrines that impinge on the liberty of individuals-and the only way of addressing them is by
imposing legal constraints on State actors-here the courts.
54.
REINER KRAAKMAN, JOHN ARMOUR, PAUL DAVIES, LUCA ENRIQUES, HENRY
HANSMANN, GERAD HERTIG, KLAUS HOPT, HIDEKI KANDA & EDWARD ROCK, THE ANATOMY OF
CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 34 (2d ed. 2009).
55. Id. at 9-11.

56.

Id.
at 11-14.

57.

EDWARD L. GLAESER, THE GOVERNANCE OF NOT-FOR-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, 1-44

(2003).
58.

Id.See also Henry B. Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit Organizations

from Corporate Income Taxation, 91 YALE L.J. 54, 55-57 (1981).
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Since corporations are State-sponsored entities with rights and
privileges that individuals do not enjoy, private transactions between
individuals and corporations raise questions about the nature of the State
sponsorship and its implications for the liberty of the individuals. If
liberty requires not just that individuals be as free from coercion as
possible, but also that they have spheres of personal autonomy and
privacy, and if the transactions between individuals and corporations
intrude into individuals' spheres of personal autonomy and privacy, then
the State may indirectly contribute to the impingement upon the liberty
of individuals through its sponsorship of the corporations. If securing the
liberty of individuals is the ultimate purpose of the State, transactions
between corporations and individuals that may intrude into individuals'
liberty should be subjected to careful scrutiny. In particular, it is
important to ask whether the State's sponsorship of any particular
corporations contributes to intrusions into individuals' liberty of any
particular kind and, if it does, whether legislatures or courts might be
able to provide any solutions to the problems. 9
III. LIFE, LIBERTY, AND THE PURSUIT OF PROPERTY
This section focuses on the relationships between liberty and
specific property law doctrines. It uses examples from human rights, the
first in time, first in right rule, findings and adverse possession, and
eminent domain to illustrate some of the ways in which property
doctrines may advance or undermine liberty, depending on whether the
doctrines are appropriately constructed and applied. But it also raises
concerns about the ways in which property law may systematically
undermine liberty, using courts' enforcements of some private land-use
restrictions as an example.
Private land-use restrictions may intrude into a property owner's
sphere of personal autonomy and privacy in ways that public land-use
restrictions cannot because they would be unconstitutional. This Article
argues, therefore, that courts should be restrained from enforcing private
land-use restrictions that would be unconstitutional if they were public
land-use restrictions. 60 This could be accomplished through 1) an
expansion in the definition of State action under the State action doctrine

59. Once again, this is not to suggest that we should look to the State for a solution to all
social problems, but here the problems may arise because of the State's sponsorship of corporate
behavior that may intrude into individuals' liberty, and the best solutions therefore may be ones that
mitigate the adverse impact of the State's policies.
60. See infra Part III.C.
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that would make courts' enforcement of private land-use restrictions
subject to all the constitutional constraints on public land-use
restrictions, 2) the enactment of state statutes that would make courts'
enforcement of private land-use restrictions subject to all the
constitutional constraints on public land-use restrictions, or 3) an
expansion in the public policy restraint on courts' enforcement of private
land-use restrictions that would make private land-use restrictions
unenforceable whenever they would be unconstitutional if they were
public land-use restrictions.6 1
Part III.A will discuss liberty and human rights and Part III.B will
discuss the first in time, first in right rule, findings and adverse
possession, and eminent domain. Finally, Part III.C will discuss the
ways in which private land-use restrictions may be used to impinge on
liberty and suggest ways in which constitutional law, state law, and the
public policy restraint on courts' enforcement of private land-use
restrictions could mitigate the problems.
A. Liberty and Human Rights
The most basic liberty is the right to be free from coercion over the
control and use of one's own body and self. To be subject to such
coercion would be slavery, the most fundamental human rights
violation. 62 A free person owns herself in the sense that her actions are
voluntary, and unless she wishes to donate her time and efforts, others
must pay her for them. In that respect, the rights a free person enjoys
over her own body and self are like property rights; they are rights that
one may trade in the labor market for income. But they are more than
simply property rights because they are fundamental to our dignity as
human beings. They are intimately related to freedoms that are central to
our unique identities such as freedoms of religion, speech, and
association that enable us to hold and practice our own beliefs, speak our
own minds, and indulge our own preferences in friends and associates.
Almost no one in any developed society today disputes any of these
freedoms, 63 although the sad truth is that they are still being breached all
61.

See infra Part III.C.

62. Article 4 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states: "No one shall be held in
slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms." G.A. Res.
217A (Ill), at 71, U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948).
63. Of course, slavery was one of the terrible ironies of early American history. Although the
Declaration of Independence held that all men are created equal and endowed with inalienable
rights, there were many slave owners in the Continental Congress that adopted it. See, e.g., PAUL
FINKELMAN, SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS: RACE AND LIBERTY IN THE AGE OF THOMAS
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around the world.64
One matter that has dogged scholars is whether a free person should
be free to sell himself into slavery. The question can be rephrased as one
about the scope of individuals' rights in their own persons: Do they
include the right of alienation? Most people seem to believe that they do
not, and individuals' rights in their own persons are inalienable under the
laws of all civilized nations. 65 The challenge is to provide a compelling
justification. A restraint on the alienability of one's rights in her person
seems to place a limit on our most basic freedom since some people who
might like to use the proceeds for the benefit of their families or others
might actually be willing to sell themselves into slavery. If they are truly
free, why should they not have the liberty to do so? Does a prohibition
on their right to sell themselves into slavery not limit their most
fundamental liberty?
If liberty means the right to be free from coercion, then the answer
is clearly yes. A State that enacted and enforced a law prohibiting its
citizens from selling themselves into slavery would have used the power
of State coercion to interfere with a private transaction. If the objective
was to minimize the use of coercion in society overall, the State's use of
coercion to deter a private transaction would be counterproductive. Of
course, there are other social values, reflected in constitutions, statutes,
and court precedents, that constrain private transactions in many ways,
but to the extent that they trump liberty, they should be subjected to the
same careful scrutiny. If liberty were the sole criterion for evaluating
social welfare, there would be no social value in any law, whether it was
under a constitution, statute, or case precedent that prohibited people
from selling themselves into slavery.66 But that does not mean the State
should use its powers of coercion to enforce such a transaction. Once
again, it is important to understand the distinction between the State
JEFFERSON (2d ed. 2001).

64. Unfortunately, the moral consensus against slavery has not ended human trafficking and
the exploitation of children and adults through coercive labor practices. See, e.g., U.N. OFFICE ON
DRUGS AND CRIME, GLOBAL REPORT ON TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS, at 9, U.N. Sales No. E.13.1V. I
(2012) (stating that more than twenty million people worldwide are victims of forced labor).
65. The preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights begins with the words:
"Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members
of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world." G.A. Res. 217A
(11), at 71, U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948).
66. Some libertarian scholars have argued that liberty includes the freedom to alienate
oneself into slavery. See, e.g., NOZICK, supra note 21, at 331 ("The comparable question about an
individual is whether a free system will allow him to sell himself into slavery. I believe that it
would."). Others have provided sophisticated arguments that it does not. See, e.g., BARNETT, supra
note 9, at 77-82 (arguing that the right to one's self is inalienable).
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using its coercive powers to prohibit voluntary, private transactions and
the State using its coercive powers to enforce private transactions.
A constitutional constraint, statute, or case precedent prohibiting a
private transaction would be suspect because it would use the State's
coercive powers to interfere with individuals' liberty. But just because
individuals might have the liberty to engage in a private transaction does
not mean that the State's coercive powers should be used to enforce it.
Although it would be unjustified for the State to prohibit a voluntary
private transaction in which an individual sold himself into slavery, it
would arguably be even more unjustified for the State to use its coercive
powers to enforce such a private transaction.67 If the social objective is
to advance liberty, therefore, the State should not prohibit private
transactions in which individuals sell themselves into slavery, but it
should not enforce them either since there is no justification for the use
of the State's coercive powers to enforce a transaction that would result
in someone losing their most fundamental liberty. If such transactions
were legal but not enforceable, individuals would be able to enter into
private agreements to serve as others' slaves, but the agreements would
not be legally binding. As a practical matter, this might destroy the
incentives for anyone to buy a slave since the seller's servitude would be
entirely permissive and therefore terminable at the seller's will, but it
would still provide the greatest liberty possible.68
B. Liberty and PrivateProperty
In theory, the State could protect its citizens from the use of
coercion without protecting their claims to any property rights in chattels
or land.69 Indeed, the enforcement of property rights by the State
presents an obvious problem, since it requires the use of the State's
coercive powers on behalf of some individuals against others. 70 Of

67. Given the importance that almost everyone attaches to her liberty, it would be legitimate
to ask whether anyone would voluntarily engage in such a transaction. But for the sake of the
argument, it is best to set that matter aside.
68. As a practical matter, although the argument here is different, it comes out close to the
same place in the end as Randy Barnett's. See BARNETT, supra note 9, at 81 ("while right-holders
may exercise their inalienable rights consistent with the wishes of others, a right-holder may never
surrender the right to change her mind in the future about whether to exercise such rights or not.")
(emphasis omitted).
69, See, e.g., EPSTEIN supra note 32, at 38 ("A system of liberty may well give each person
rights over his or her own person, but it does not in and of itself do much to assign ownership rights
over things in the external world.").
70. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 36, at 22 ("litigation ... involves the threat of the use of
public force against a recalcitrant defendant.").
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course, the State's coercion would be exercised against only those
individuals who infringed upon or challenged the property rights of
others, and an individual's liberty does not include the right to infringe
upon other individuals' rights.7 1 Of course, the use of coercion by the
State could also be justified by consequentialist objectives such as
increasing the freedoms of individuals to use and dispose of chattels,
land, and intellectual property, and creating incentives for individuals to
invent, innovate, and develop their property. Although the primary focus
of this Article is on liberty, a well-defined system of property law
provides the foundations for a productive and materially prosperous
society and helps to free people from hunger and want.72
The challenge, of course, is how to define the property rights that
the government should enforce. It is helpful first to conceptualize the
role of private law and its components-property, contract, and tort.
Although these are separate areas of law, they are interrelated. Private
law rests in a fundamental way on a system of property rights.73 Tort and
contract laws help to define the scope of property rights, although the
scope is also defined by the inherent powers of the State and any'
relevant governmental regulations.74 When a person acquires private
property rights in chattels or land, those define her right to possess, use,
and dispose of the chattels or land, as well as her rights to preclude
others from exercising the same rights.75 Property rights can be quite
nuanced. For example, a person can have the right to possess and use
chattels, as well as the right to dispose of them by abandonment or gift,
but not the right to dispose of them by sale; for another example, a
person could have the right to possess a parcel of land and to use it for
residential purposes, but not to use it for commercial or industrial
76
purposes.
BARNETT, supra note 9, at 73 observes that "rights are relational" and that if individuals
71.
should "act in such a manner as to prevent others from using their rightfully owned resources then
the purpose of having rights in the first place would be defeated."
72. Freyfogle, supra note 14, generally argues that most libertarian scholars ultimately
depend on consequentialist arguments. Of course, some do so more explicitly than others. For
example, EPSTEIN, supra note 36, at 79 argues that property rules should be designed to maximize
the total value of property holdings. However, HAYEK, supra note 7, at 61 sounded a warning about
the limitations of consequentialist arguments.
73. As a matter of logic, the right to make a claim against another for an injury to one's
person or property in tort presumes rights in one's person or property, as does the right to alienate
one's rights in one's person or property through a contract.
74. See infra Part II.C.
75. EPSTEIN, supra note 36, at79.
76. Id. See also JESSE DUKEMINIER, JAMES E. KRIER, GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, MICHAEL
H. SCHILL & LIOR JACOB STRAHILEVITZ, PROPERTY 102-03 (8th ed. 2014) for a discussion of the
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When we say that someone owns something we merely mean that
at present that person has the strongest property claim of anyone to that
thing; we do not mean to imply that the person's property claim is
absolute and without qualification or that it is unlimited and will always
necessarily remain the strongest. 7 Moreover, there is nothing inherent in
a regime of private property rights that necessarily involves the exercise
of coercion, either by the State or the owners of private property. In
matters of private law, the State exercises coercion only when it enforces
private legal rights. If a person's property claim is subject to a claim by
another, and the person concedes ownership, then there will be no
exercise of coercion by the State. If, however, a person is in possession
of chattels when another challenges her property rights and she does not
concede ownership, then the other person will have to petition a court to
78
issue an injunction to force her to transfer possession of the chattels.
Even then, the court would only exercise the State's coercive powers if it
did issue the injunction.
In fact, the property dispute would probably only arise at all if there
was a disagreement about the assignment of property rights in the first
place. Such a disagreement would normally arise only if there was some
uncertainty about the relative strength of the parties' property claims. If
both parties knew with certainty that a court would side with the person
in possession, the other party would have little, if any, incentive to go
the expense of making the challenge. 79 And if both parties knew with
certainty that the challenger would win the contest, the person in
possession would have little, if any, incentive to defend against the
challenge. 80 To the extent that any exercise of State coercion was
necessary, therefore, it could generally be attributed to the uncertainty in
the property laws that gave the parties an incentive to take their dispute
to court. In that respect, liberty could be furthered by clarifying the
property laws, but not by modifying them in any way that would make
them more uncertain.
There is an obvious tension, however, between pressures to
"bundle of rights" theory of property.

77. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 76, at 126-27 for a discussion of the "relational"
nature of property rights.
78. The other person would seek an injunction under an action in replevin if the dispute were
over the possession of chattels and an injunction under an action in ejectment if the dispute was over
land. Id. at 128.

79.

This was an early insight from the law and economics literature. See generally William

M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. & EcON. 61 (1971); Richard A. Posner, An
Economic Approach to Legal Procedureand Judicial Administration,2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399 (1973).

80.

See generally Landes, supranote 79; Posner, supra note 79.
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improve the private laws and pressures to maintain stability and
predictability. 81 Once the basic parameters of an effective system of
private laws have been established, an incremental approach to
improvements may be most efficacious. 82 Nonetheless, it would be a
mistake to presume that stability and certainty should always prevail
over the need for innovation and change. As society and technologies
evolve, and as our understanding of the consequences and implications
of the laws that we have grows, it may be possible to comprehend ways
in which innovations in our private laws could not only
help to advance
83
liberty but also help to vindicate other social values.
It is important to anticipate that some of the political pressures for
legal reforms may be antithetical to liberty. This is partly because in a
democracy some groups will always try to use the levers of the State for
self-serving and ill-conceived goals. Because a system of private
property rights implies a distribution of wealth, there will also inevitably
be pressures to use the levers of the State to redistribute property.
Indeed, there is an important sense in which private property rights
confer freedoms on some at the expense of others. Since private property
rights typically include the right to exclude, they typically also limit the
rights of others to use. When the State enforces private property rights,
therefore, it uses its coercive powers to exclude non-owners from the use
and enjoyment of the property.
There are obviously compelling reasons for the State to protect
private property rights, but it would be cavalier to disregard the potential
for inequity. 84 A society, for example, in which a small minority owned
all of the property might be unjust. 85 The majority might understandably
feel that the State was a mere fagade for the interests of the minority,

81. HAYEK, supra note 7, at 231 acknowledged that "[t]here is ample scope for
experimentation and improvement within ...[the] ...legal framework which makes it possible for
a free society to operate most efficiently." Yet, he also wrote that "[slo far as possible, our aim
should be to improve human institutions so as to increase the chances of correct foresight." Id at 30.
82. Id.
83. Hayek observed that "the continuous growth of wealth and technological knowledge...
will constantly suggest new ways in which government might render services to its citizens ......
Id. at 231. He also wrote of the "scope for.., improvement within ... [the] . . . legal framework
which makes it possible for a free society to operate most efficiently." Id.
84. The consequentialist justifications often rest on maximizing the value of the property or
maximizing utility. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 36, at 79. BARNETT supra note 9, at 64-72
develops a natural rights justification.
85. As a general matter, many libertarian scholars might disagree. NOZICK, supra note 21, at
274-75 not only argues against the idea of redistribution but also predicts that it would ultimately
benefit the middle-class. HAYEK, supra note 7, at 232 argues that efforts directed at redistribution
ultimately undermine the order of an existing legal system and result in a command economy.
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especially if the society offered little hope for the majority to acquire
property of their own. The majority might become alienated from its
government; in fact, one wonders whether the government could
persist
86
unless it used the power of State coercion to suppress dissent.
Some libertarians are opposed to redistribution altogether. 87 It is not
difficult to understand their concerns. Redistribution not only requires
the use of State coercion, but it also encourages individuals to reallocate
their time and efforts away from productive activities and towards
political ones that will increase their share of the society's material
resources. 88 Even the possibility that the State might engage in the
redistribution of resources encourages unproductive investments of time
and effort in politics. There is some logic, therefore, in strictly opposing
redistribution. But while the logic is compelling, it would be a mistake
to believe that it eliminates the need to address redistribution issues.
To begin with, liberty is not the only factor to consider in the
calculus of social welfare, and other social values might justify a use of
the State's coercive powers to redistribute resources.89 Moreover, if the
State is going to protect liberty, it will need financing, and that means
the need for tax revenues. Unfortunately, taxation inevitably raises
redistribution issues. 90 Finally, liberty can probably only thrive in a
democracy, 9' and in a democracy the weight of the electorate is likely to
make redistribution an ongoing political issue. 92 The most sensible
response would be to devise redistribution policies that interfere with
liberty as little as possible. That would be a Herculean task, and it cannot
be undertaken here, but it is an issue that any full treatment of the
relationship between liberty and private property will ultimately have to
86. The hypothetical probably better describes a totalitarian State than any existing or
historical democracy. Since a totalitarian State would be antithetical to liberty, its demise would be
welcome.
87. See, e.g., NOZICK, supranote 21, at 274-75; HAYEK, supranote 7, at 232.
88. See, e.g., Robert D. Tollison, The Economic Theory of Rent Seeking, 152 PUBLIC CHOICE
73, 74 (2012).
89. There are, for example, people who are clearly unable to provide for themselves by dint
of their physical or mental limitations. These include small children, adults who are severely
disabled, and those who are mentally ill.
90. Should the State be financed through a head tax? Even if a head tax was feasible, would it
be fair, especially if some individuals received more protection from coercion and other government
services than others? And what if some individuals could not afford to pay the tax? Since taxes
themselves have redistributive effects, the need for taxes makes the need to address redistribution
issues inevitable.
91.
For a classic argument, see CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS: THE
WORLD'S POLITICAL-ECONOMIC SYSTEMS (1977).

92.

See, e.g., George J. Stigler, Director's Law of Public Income Redistribution, 13 J.L. &

ECON. 1 (1970).
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address.
1. First In Time, First In Right
The most basic principle of property is that the first person to take
possession of something acquires the strongest claim to it. 93 This is the
first in time, first in right rule. It has a strong intuitive appeal. Indeed,
94
some scholars have justified it using natural rights arguments.
Regardless of the merits of those arguments, the first in time rule also
seems to minimize the exercise of coercion. As a general matter, it
implies that the first person to take possession of something will be
protected by the State against others who might forcibly try to take
possession from them.95 The first possessor would normally retain her
them voluntarily to
possessory rights until she decided to transfer
96
someone else through a contract, gift, or devise.
The most obvious alternative to the first in time rule would be one
that allowed the current possessor to have the strongest property claim
even if the current possessor was not the first possessor. It seems
reasonable to predict that, under the alternative rule, at least some
individuals would devote their time and energy to trying to usurp
possession (and thus property rights) from the first-possessors; the firstpossessors would then have to devote time and resources to retaining
possession (and, thus, their property rights). 97 Moreover, some
individuals would probably be tempted to acquire possession from
others coercively; thus, the State would probably have to exercise more
coercion to police against the use of coercion, and the first-possessors
would probably have to use more coercion against other individuals to
retain possession. A rule that favored the current possessor would
therefore probably increase the use of coercion by both individuals and
the State.
As every law student quickly learns, the concept of possession is
93.

This is the first principle of property that tens of thousands of law students have been

taught. It is the rule that comes out of that case about the fox, Piersonv. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175, 177-79
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805).
94. See. e.g., BARNETT, supra note 9, at 68-7 1.

95. Of course, the concept of possession is malleable. Under the doctrine of constructive
possession a person may be deemed to have possession of something even without having dominion
and control over it. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 76, at 32.
96. Of course, in some cases, her rights might be terminated through eminent domain or
subordinated by an adverse possessor or finder. See the discussion, infia Part II1.B.3.
97.

The same logic could be applied to any alternative rule. It would always provide an

incentive for individuals to acquire superior property rights to the first-possessor, and that would
mean a waste of time and energy as well as a potential increase in the use of coercion.
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slippery, and so, the first in time rule is malleable. The first person to
acquire possession has the strongest claim to something, but possession
may be constructive rather than actual.9 8 Moreover, because the legal
definition of constructive possession is a muddy one, the doctrine gives
courts considerable discretion in assigning initial property rights. 99 For
example, a court might apply the doctrine under circumstances when a
person is merely in pursuit of something rather than in actual physical
possession; however, the court would normally only apply the doctrine
in such a case if the person in pursuit was highly likely under the
circumstances to succeed in gaining actual physical possession, but this
would still give the court considerable wiggle room.' 00 The doctrine can
obviously be rationalized on other grounds, but it is at least a happy
coincidence that it also helps to forestall the exercise of coercion by the
person in pursuit against other persons that might intervene and take
actual possession before the person in pursuit, and vice versa.
2. Findings And Adverse Possession
Other property rules, such as those for findings and adverse
possessions, probably also minimize the exercise of coercion. Under the
law of findings, for example, the finder of lost chattels usually has
superior property rights against all except the owner.'01 The findings rule
protects the finder against coercive efforts that others might engage in to
acquire possession from her, and it thus diminishes the incentives for
others to engage in such coercion.' 0 2 Of course, courts would normally
use their coercive powers to help an owner reclaim possession within
some reasonable time of the finding. At some point, however, the statute
of limitations on an action in replevin would normally preclude the
original owner from using the courts to reclaim possession and the finder
would become the de facto new owner.' 0 3 The same basic scheme of
rules applies in adverse possession cases. An adverse possessor has a

98.

DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 76, at 32.

99. Thus, the case about the whale, Ghen v. Rich, 8 F. 159, 161-62 (D. Mass. 1881), in which
the beachcomber who first took physical possession of a whale was liable to the whaler who killed
it.

100. This is the logic of Barbeyrac's rule, which states that a hunter in pursuit of a wild beast
with "large dogs and hounds" has constructive possession whereas a hunter in pursuit merely with
"beagles only" does not. Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175, 181 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805).
101. This is the rule of Armory v. Delamirie, (1722) 93 Eng. Rep. 664 (K.B.).
102. As in Armory v. Delamirie, in which the court prevented a jeweler from converting an
item ofjewelry found by a chimney sweep. Id.
103.

DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 76, at 143.
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superior property claim against all except the owner.' 0 4 This has the
virtue of protecting the adverse possessor from the use of coercion by
others attempting to acquire possession from him, and it diminishes the
incentives for others to engage in such coercion. The original owner is
able to use the coercive powers of the courts to reclaim possession of the
land until the statute of limitations on an action in ejectment runs out. At
that point, the adverse possessor becomes the de facto new owner.
One could argue that the rule for adverse possession actually gives
individuals an incentive to use coercion to force owners off their lands
so that they can then begin possessing adversely and eventually make an
adverse possession claim. However, this use of coercion would be illegal
under criminal laws, and statutes of limitations on actions in ejectment
by owners against adverse possessors are generally more than long
enough to give owners time to protect their property rights. 105 Moreover,
in some jurisdictions an adverse possession claim must be made in good
faith, and a claim based on the forcible ejection of the owner would
never succeed. It is not surprising, therefore, that adverse possession
claims rarely, if ever, arise from adverse possessors' use of coercion
against owners. In fact, adverse possession claims most commonly arise
for more innocuous reasons, such as boundary disputes and surveying
errors, and both the adverse possessor and the owner are often surprised
to find themselves in a legal dispute. 106
If the objective is to minimize the exercise of coercion, the only
obvious way of improving the rules governing findings and adverse
possession would be to make it clearer how the rules would apply. That
would reduce the legal uncertainty that might require the exercise of
coercion by the courts. For example, if it were crystal clear in a findings
case exactly when the statute of limitations on an action in replevin
would run out, there would hardly ever be any need for the original
owner to take legal recourse to reclaim possession; the finder would be a
fool to go to the expense and bother of trying to defend against the
owner's action before the statute of limitations had run out, and the
original owner would be foolish to go to the expense of trying to reclaim
possession after the statute of limitations had run out.'07

104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at144-45.
Id.
Id. at 163.
See generally Landes, supra note 79; Posner, supra note 79.

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[49:01

3 .Eminent Domain
An individual's property rights are never absolute. Even if they are
otherwise unregulated by either public or private restrictions, an
individual's property rights can still be condemned by the State through
the power of eminent domain.' 08 In the United States, and most, if not
all, democratic nations, the government's power to take' 0 9 private
property is constitutionally limited and, thus, regulated by the courts, but
it does, nonetheless, provide an important, if controversial, limitation on
private property rights." 0 Whether it is constitutionally limited or not,
therefore, the power of eminent domain helps to define the scope of an
individual's private property rights.
For example, a person's property rights in land are limited by the
government's constitutional right to take the land, subject to whatever
compensation, if any, the government may be required to provide for the
taking."' In this respect, the government's power to take the land is
similar to the right of entry or power of termination that a grantor retains
in land whenever the grantor conveys a fee simple subject to a condition
subsequent to a grantee; although, in contrast to a taking by the
government, the grantor is not normally required to pay any
compensation after asserting a right of entry." 2 Perhaps the biggest
difference between the government's power of eminent domain and a
right of entry is that eminent domain gives the government the
equivalent of a right of entry automatically and not because a grantor has
elected to retain a right of entry in conveying property to a grantee. 113
The State's power of eminent domain undermines liberty because it
requires the use of the State's coercive powers against an individual.
That is inherently problematic because the powers of the State in any
108. For a thorough overview of the topic, see DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 76, at 11071266.
109. In a democracy, the power of eminent domain is typically exercised by government
officials on behalf of an elected executive or legislature; the reference to the "government's powers
to take" rather than the "State's power to take" is intended to comport with that reality and common
parlance.
110. The fact that the State's powers of eminent domain are regulated by the courts-a branch
of government-is worth noting. In a State that had no real separation of powers, such that the
judiciary was not truly independent of the executive branch, there would be no effective restraint on
the scope of the government's takings powers. See COOTER, supra note 24, at 225-34.
111. Under the United States Constitution, "just compensation" is required. U.S. CONST.
amend. V.
112. For an overview of defeasible fee simples and the fee simple subject to a condition
subsequent, see DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 76, at 244-74.
113. Eminent domain limits private property rights automatically in the sense that it is not a
limitation placed upon a property interest expressly at the time it is granted.
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representative democracy might be wielded on behalf of a tyrannical
majority, or even a disproportionately powerful minority. It is true, in the
United States at least, that the State's takings powers are constitutionally
limited, and just compensation must be provided even when they are
exercised. It is also true that the State's takings powers have expanded
significantly over the last several decades, 1 4 and that just compensation
is rarely, if ever, fully sufficient to compensate expropriated property
owners fully
for the subjective values that they place on the property that
15
is taken.

Just compensation is generally inadequate because it is calculated
using estimates of market values rather than the owners' true subjective
values. As every undergraduate student learns in an introductory
microeconomics course, the market price in a well-functioning,
competitive market (which is the usual assumption for real estate
markets) reflects the marginal valuation of what is being soldintuitively, the marginal value of the last property of that type sold." 16
Almost all buyers in such a market, however, are infra-marginal, and
they value the properties they buy more than the prices they pay for
them."17 That is why a well-functioning, competitive market generates
buyers' (or, in the case of consumer goods, "consumer") surplus. The
surplus earned by any individual buyer is the difference between the
value they place on whatever it is they are buying and the price they
must pay to make the purchase. IS If a property owner is compensated
for a taking in an amount exactly equal to the market price, therefore,
she will lose all of the surplus value she enjoyed from her property. 119
This, no doubt, explains why most property owners are typically
disgruntled when they are subjected to a taking.
The United States Constitution expressly limits the government's20
power of eminent domain to cases where the taking is for a public use.
The Supreme Court's definition of a public use thus defines the scope of
the government's takings powers. It is not surprising, therefore, that the
Supreme Court's recent holdings expanding the definition of public use
have caused so much controversy.' 2' Historically, the Court defined
114.

See infra notes 120-127 and accompanying text.
115. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 76, at 1127-29.
116. Id. See also DAVID M. KREPS, MICROECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS
COMPETITIVE MARKETS (2013) for an introduction to microeconomic theory.
117. KREPS, supra note 116, at 296-303.
118. Id.
119.
DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 76, at 1127-29.

120.
121.

1: CHOICE AND

Id. at1129.
See, in particular, Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). For a sample of the
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public uses narrowly, essentially limiting the power of eminent domain
to takings of land for uses that would make the land open to the public or
provide it to private carriers who would make their transportation
services open to the public. 122 In a series of recent cases, however, the
Supreme Court has gradually expanded the scope of permissible public
uses, initially to include takings from some private owners to others for
the purpose of redeveloping blighted neighborhoods, but more recently
to include takings from some private owners to others for the purpose of
redeveloping non-blighted
neighborhoods as part of integrated
123
redevelopment plans.

Takings for public uses that involve making the land open to the
public or providing it to public carriers who will make their services
open to the public may be justified as necessary to provide public
goods. 124 If there are strong enough public good justifications for a
taking, those might be sufficient to justify the exercise of State coercion
against private property owners.125 But if the government's takings
power is exercised to reallocate properties from some private owners to
others simply for the purpose of encouraging economic development in
non-blighted neighborhoods, that is another matter. Opening the door to
the use of State coercion against some individuals for the benefit of
others opens the door to an abuse of the State's powers by those who are
the most wealthy and influential against those who are the least wealthy
and influential. 126 The State could thus serve as an instrument for exactly
immediate critical reactions to Kelo, see the following: Orlando E. Delogu, Kelo v. City of New
London-Wrongly Decided and a Missed Opportunity for PrincipledLine Drawingwith Respect to
Eminent Domain Takings, 58 ME. L. REV. 17 (2006); Sonya D. Jones, Note and Comment, That
Land Is Your Land, This Land Is My Land... Until the Local Government Can Turn It for a Profit:
A Critical Analysis of Kelo v. City of New London, 20 BYU J. PUB. L. 139 (2005); and Charles E.
Cohen, Eminent Domain after Kelo v. City of New London: An Argumentfor Banning Economic
Development Takings, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 491 (2006).
122.
Justice O'Connor provided a useful overview of the historical development of the public

use requirement in her dissenting opinion in Kelo. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 496-504 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
123.

Id. at 519. See also Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 231 (1984).

124. Pure public goods are characterized by the impossibility of excluding anyone from
consuming them and their inexhaustible availability for consumption by everyone once they have
been provided. ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 45-46 (5th ed. 2008).

Obviously, pure public goods are extremely rare, but some goods have enough of their
characteristics to come close, and it is those ones to which the term "public goods" typically refers.
125. This concurs with Justice O'Connor's dissenting opinion in Kelo. 545 U.S. at 496-504
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
126.

As Justice O'Connor explained, "[T]he fallout from this decision will not be random. The

beneficiaries are likely to be those citizens with disproportionate influence and power in the
political process, including large corporations and development firms. As for the victims, the
government now has license to transfer property from those with fewer resources to those with
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the kind of coercion that it is supposed to prevent. If liberty is the
cornerstone of a just society, the power of eminent domain should be
confined to cases where it is essential to the provision of public goods. 127
C. PrivateLand- Use Restrictions
Land uses may be restricted under public laws, usually local landuse ordinances, or private laws, usually private servitudes. 2 ' The
servitudes in most new residential developments are established in a
document detailing the "Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions," or the
CC&Rs as they are commonly known. 129 In most common interest
communities, the CC&Rs provide for the establishment and operation of
a Home Owners' Association, or HOA, which is typically organized as a
non-profit corporation and governed by an elected Board of Directors. 130
The Board of Directors' duties typically include the responsibility for the
enforcement of the CC&Rs.131 The CC&Rs typically also outline a
process that can be used to amend the CC&Rs; this process typically
requires homeowners to vote to approve the proposed amendments. 132
Since many of the services provided by the HOA under the CC&Rs
are similar to services provided by a local government, and since the
HOA itself is governed by electoral processes that are similar to those
through which local government officials are elected, private land-use
restrictions are analogous to public land-use restrictions in many
ways. 133 There is, however, an important difference. Local governments'
more." Id. at 505.
127. This would make the definition of a public good central to the scope of the government's
takings powers, and since the definition of a public good is somewhat nebulous, that would, to some
extent, simply change the focus of the debate. But the traditional public uses much more to clearly
satisfy the public good requirement than controversial redevelopment plans such as those in Kelo.
128. For an introduction to private land-use restrictions, see GERALD KORNGOLD, PRIVATE
LAND USE ARRANGEMENTS: EASEMENTS, REAL COVENANTS, AND EQUITABLE SERVITUDES (2d ed.

2004).
129.

For an overview of modem residential real estate developments, see Wayne S. Hyatt,

Common Interest Communities: Evolution and Reinvention, 31 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 303 (1998).

130.

For a comprehensive

treatment of the governance issues in common

interest

communities, see ADRIENNE SCHMITZ ET AL., RESIDENTIAL DEVELOPMENT HANDBOOK 185-210

(3d ed. 2004).
131.

Id.

132.
133.

Id.
For a sample of the commentary, see Harvey Rishikof & Alexander Wohl, Private

Communities or Public Governments: "The State Will Make the Call", 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 509,

521 (1996); David J. Kennedy, ResidentialAssociations as State Actors: Regulating the Impact of
Gated Communities on Nonmembers, 105 YALE L.J. 761, 763 (1995); Shirley L. Mays,
Privatization of Municipal Services: A Contagion in the Body Politic, 34 DUQ. L. REV. 41, 57
(1995); and ROBERT JAY DILGER, NEIGHBORHOOD POLITICS: RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY
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land-use ordinances are subject to the full panoply of constitutional
constraints;
however, as a general matter, private land-use restrictions
34
are not. 1
If a city government enacts an ordinance that impinges on a
property owner's First Amendment rights, for example, by forbidding
the owner from posting any signs supporting candidates for political
office during an election, the courts will declare the ordinance
unconstitutional and decline to enforce it. 135 Or, if the government enacts
an ordinance that establishes an architectural board and empowers it to
approve or deny any architectural modifications to structures in the
neighborhood using such vague guidelines that no one can understand
them or predict how they will apply, the courts will strike the ordinance
on the grounds of being unconstitutionally vague.1 36 In each of these
cases, the State's exercise of coercion (through the underlying threat of
penalties for any property owner who posts a political sign or modifies
her property's architecture without the required approval) would be
constrained by the United States Constitution or a state constitution.
Thus, the property owners' sphere of personal autonomy and privacy
would be protected and liberty would be advanced.
As a general matter, however, constitutional constraints do not
apply to private land-use restrictions, such as the CC&Rs in a modem
residential property development. 137 Thus, if the CC&Rs in a residential
development forbid a property owner from posting political signs, the
Board of Directors of the HOA may order her not to do so and even
impose financial penalties on her if she fails to comply.13 8 And if the
CC&Rs establish architectural guidelines and require the approval of an
architectural review board for any modifications to the exterior of a
ASSOCIATIONS IN AMERICAN GOVERNANCE 62 (1992).

134. For an early argument, however, that HOAs should be subject to constitutional
constraints see Katharine Rosenberry, The Application of the Federal and State Constitutions to
Condominiums, Cooperatives and Planned Developments, 19 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. I, 30

(1984).
135. See, e.g., City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 58-59 (1994).
136. See, e.g., Anderson v. City of Issaquah, 851 P.2d 744, 746 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993).
137. For an extended analysis that corroborates that conclusion, see Lisa J. Chadderdon, Note,
No Political Speech Allowed: Common Interest Developments, Homeowners Associations, and
Restrictions on Free Speech, 21 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 233 (2006). For arguments that
constitutional constraints should apply to CC&Rs, see Rosenberry, supra note 134; John C. Toews,
Comment, Validity Rules Concerning Public Zoning and Private Covenants: A Comparison and
Critique, 39 S. CAL. L. REV. 409 (1966); and Mark Urban, Comment, An Evaluation of the
Applicability of Zoning Principles to the Law of Private Land Use Restrictions, 21 UCLA L. REV.
1655 (1974).
138.
EVAN MCKENZIE, PRIVATOPIA: HOMEOWNER
RESIDENTIAL PRIVATE GOVERNMENT 21 (1994).

ASSOCATIONS AND THE

RISE OF
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house, the board's decisions will generally be enforceable regardless of
whether the guidelines are vague.139
An HOA and its governance structures are established under private
law, and even though HOAs have begun to assume some of the
responsibilities of local governments and increasingly appear to operate
as if they were private governments, as private entities they are generally
beyond the reach of any constitutional constraints. 140 This is problematic
because ultimately, if they are to have any teeth, the CC&Rs that an
HOA enforces must be enforceable in the courts. It would be pointless,
for example, for an HOA to levy assessments (in other words, impose
financial penalties) against a homeowner for failing to comply with the
CC&Rs unless the HOA could gain the assistance of the courts in
enforcing the assessments.' 4 1 The State is thus ultimately complicit in
the enforcement of private land-use restrictions. What if the CC&Rs go
too far? What if they regulate a homeowner's land uses in ways that a
local government could not? More importantly, what if they intrude into
the spheres of personal autonomy and privacy that are essential to
individuals' liberty?
Under the State action doctrine, constraints against government in
the United States and state constitutions usually apply only to State
actors, and in enforcing private laws, courts have not generally been
treated as State actors, 42 There is, of course, one well-known exception.
In Shelley v. Kraemer, the United States Supreme Court held that any
court that enforced racially restrictive covenants would violate the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 43 The Supreme Court,
in effect, treated the judicial branch as a State actor in the enforcement
of the racially restrictive covenants even though the covenants were
created under private law. 144 This expanded the scope of State action

139.

Toews, supra note 137, at412; Urban, supra note 137, at 1679-80.

140.

See generally MCKENZIE, supra note 138. There are exceptions. In some cases, state

constitutional constraints might apply to private actors because State action is not required. See, e.g.,
Golden Gateway Ctr. v. Golden Gateway Tenants Ass'n., 29 P.3d 797, 827 (Cal. 2001) (Werdegar,
dissenting) (construing free speech protections under the California Constitution). Moreover,
J.,
HOAs may also be constrained by federal or state statutes. See, e.g., Amin v. 5757 N. Sheridan Rd.
Condo Ass'n., No. 12 CV 446, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67930, at *2 (N.D. Ill. May 15, 2012)
(quoting the Illinois Condominium Act, which states that HOAs may not make any rules impairing

free exercise of religion rights guaranteed under the United States Constitution or the Illinois
Constitution). See also 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 605/18.4(h) (Westlaw through P.A. 99-140
2015).
See, e.g., SCHMITZ ET AL., supra note 130.
141.
142. See the discussion supra Part II.
143. 334 U.S. 1, 8-23 (1948).
144. As Justice Vinson wrote in the majority opinion, "We have no doubt that there has been
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under the State action doctrine, and, at least in theory, opened the door to
a much wider range of constitutional constraints on the use of the courts
to enforce private land-use restrictions. In practice, however, the State
action doctrine continues to be applied narrowly; 145 Shelley v. Kramer is
a clear outlier and has been widely criticized-not for the outcome in the
case, because hardly anyone would want racially restrictive covenants to
be enforceable, but for creating a glaring inconsistency in the case law
and confounding the State action doctrine. 146 It may be regrettable, but it
is perhaps not surprising that courts have generally declined to extend
the Shelley precedent to other private law cases. 147 There is no logical
reason, however, why the judicial branch of government should be
treated differently than the legislative or executive branches or why the
use of State coercion to enforce
private legal rights is any different than
148
its use to enforce public laws.
Some scholars have tried to justify strict enforcement of private
land-use restrictions using a freedom of contract argument that
individuals impliedly consent to the exercise of State coercion against
them when they assume private legal obligations under contracts with
other individuals. 149 Since private land-use restrictions are created
voluntarily, and since the parties who create them, or become owners of
land bound by them, may be presumed to have impliedly consented to
the restrictions, some might argue that courts' failure to enforce them
would undermine the autonomy and will of the parties who created
them.150 That is a compelling argument that justifies the use of State
coercion to enforce most private legal obligations. But it does not justify
judicial enforcements of private legal obligations that would undermine
individuals' liberty. 151 Many scholars concur that agreements alienating
[S]tate action ... in the full and complete sense of the phrase." Id. at 19.
145. Chemerinsky, supra note 46, at 527-31.
146. See, e.g., Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principlesof ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 29 (1959); Choper, supra note 43, at 769-71; and George Rutherglen, The Improbable
History of Section 1981: Clio Still Bemused and Confused, 2003 SuP. CT. REV. 303, 329 (2003).
147. Chemerinsky, supra note 46, at 527-31.
148. That does not mean, of course, that there are no legal reasons. The State action doctrine
has created an important legal difference between actions of the judicial branch and actions of the
executive and legislative branches.
149. See, e.g., BARNETT, supra note 9, at 53-57, who defines principles of "consensual
transfer," and Richard A. Epstein, Notice and Freedom of Contract in the Law of Servitudes, 55 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1353, 1368 (1981), who argues that we should accept the basic proposition that
contract terms shall be binding on the original parties who create them and on all third parties who
take with notice of the terms.
150. Epstein, supra note 149.
151.
BARNETT, supra note 9, at 77-82, discusses reasons for constraining "consensual
freedom" and concludes that not all rights are necessarily alienable. Epstein, supra note 149, at
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certain liberties should not be enforceable by the State."' For example,
would we want courts to enforce an agreement under which one
individual or group of individuals paid another individual or group of
individuals not to vote? Would we want courts to enforce a private landuse restriction that allowed homeowners to post signs in favor of
Republican candidates, but not Democratic ones?
These may seem like contrived examples since they involve
particularly important liberties that have far-reaching social and political
implications. But if anyone is going to argue that the courts should
enforce private agreements alienating other liberties even though the
other liberties are also constitutionally protected against government
intrusions, they should be prepared to explain where we are to draw the
53
line between liberties that are fully alienable and those that are not.
The line may be deceptively difficult to draw. For example, should
courts enforce an agreement under which an individual gives another
individual consideration in return for not posting any political signs
during an election? 54 If not, why should courts enforce a private landuse restriction that forbids a homeowner from posting political signs
during an election, especially if it has been established that they would
not enforce a city ordinance that forbid the homeowner from posting
such signs? 5 5 Individuals would presumably receive an accommodation
in the price of the home for knowingly accepting it with either public or
private restrictions on such signs, so why treat the cases differently? And
if the courts decline to enforce the legislature's sign restrictions, why
should they enforce an HOA's?
The freedom of contract argument ignores the third parties whose
liberty might be diminished by the enforcement of private land-use
restrictions. Private land-use restrictions convey with the land from the
parties who created them to their successors in interest.' 56 Thus, the land
1368 takes a stronger position in favor of free alienability, but also acknowledges limitations.
152. See BARNETT, supra note 9; Epstein, supra note 149.
153.
BARNETT, supra note 9, at 77-82 argues that certain liberties are inherently inalienable,
but his purpose is different, and he does not seek to address this question.
154. See, Alan E. Garfield, Promises of Silence: Contract Law and Freedom ofSpeech, 83

CORNELL L. REV. 261, 344-45 (1998) for a discussion of the nuances. Professor Garfield observes
that the issues have not been widely addressed, but argues that courts should generally refrain from
using their powers to suppress speech.

155.

Nuisance considerations might justify some government restrictions on speech rights but

it is not clear why they should justify allowing more restrictions under private law than under public

law.
156. To be more precise, real covenants have been said to convey with estates in land;
equitable servitudes have been said to attach to the land directly. This, however, is a technical

distinction of fading relevance.
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can end up being owned by someone who never particularly cared about
the restrictions and might even find them obnoxious. To the extent that
the restrictions remain enforceable after the land is conveyed by the
parties who created them, they may continue to restrict land uses when
virtually all landowners find them objectionable. Moreover, they would
continue to apply against prospective buyers who had no say in their
creation. In that respect, State coercion would inevitably be used against
individuals without their implied consent. 157
The constitutional constraints on State action reflect important
social values and protect fundamental individual liberties, and there is no
logical reason why those constraints should not apply to the judicial
branch's enforcement of private laws just as they apply to acts of the
executive or legislative branches. But that does not necessarily mean that
the constraints should or have to apply as a matter of constitutional law.
In fact, the issue is probably moot, because under the State action
doctrine judicial enforcements of private laws are generally not
considered State acts, and the scope of the State action doctrine is not
likely to be expanded anytime soon. 5 8 But there are other ways in which
the important social values that underlie constitutional constraints
against the State can be respected.
Shelley v. Kraemer was an easy case. A racially restrictive covenant
would generally be invoked only if a homeowner attempted to sell his
property to someone who was a member of a race to whom alienation
was forbidden. 159 Both the homeowner and the prospective buyer would
want to engage in the transaction; the opposition would come from other
homeowners in the neighborhood who wanted to prevent a member of
the prospective buyer's race from living in their neighborhood. If a court
enforced the restriction it would be using the State's coercive powers to
frustrate the wishes of the buyer and seller. 6 0 The idea that an individual
(the prospective buyer) could be compelled to pay taxes that help to
finance the exercise of coercion against herself when there is no
plausible way in which she could obtain any reciprocal freedom from the
coercion of others (or any other benefits, except perhaps the courts'
assistance in discriminating against others) is troublesome. In the final
157.

It would strain the meaning of consent, for example, to suggest that the Shelleys

"consented" to the racially restrictive covenants in Shelley v. Kraemer.
158. Chemerinsky, supra note 46, at 507-13.
159. Of course, this is exactly what happened in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1948).
160.
Presumably the seller, who must have either created the restriction or purchased the land
subject to the restriction, would no longer wish to be bound by it. If courts held that the seller should

not be bound by his initial consent to the restrictions, then the restrictions would effectively be
inalienable. BARNETT, supra note 9, at 81.
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analysis, if a court enforced a racially restrictive covenant it would, in
effect, be serving as the instrumentality for the racist neighbors' exercise
of coercion against the prospective buyer.
Many other private land-use restrictions raise similar policy
considerations. Suppose, for example, that a private restriction prohibits
homeowners from posting signs in favor of candidates for political
office.' 6 1 The United States Supreme Court has declared similar public
land-use restrictions unconstitutional on the grounds that they violate the
First Amendment.' 62 Those rulings advance liberty, of course, because it
would be inappropriate to allow a local government to use its coercive
powers to suppress homeowners' First Amendment rights. If a court
enforced a private land-use restriction prohibiting the same political
signs it would be using the State's coercive powers to suppress
homeowners' speech no less than if the restriction arose from a public
land-use restriction. In fact, the case might be even more problematic
than one involving a public restriction since the State might be expected
to enforce a public restriction more consistently and uniformly than a
relatively small group of neighbors acting through their HOA in a
residential development. For example, if all the neighbors were
Republican, they might not enforce the restriction against a homeowner
who posted a sign supporting a Republican candidate, even though they
would enforce the restriction against a homeowner who posted a sign
supporting a Democratic candidate.
For another example, consider a case in which an HOA adopts a
new restriction that prohibits religious gatherings in a common room,
but continues to allow non-religious gatherings.' 63 To be more specific,
161. This is hardly just a hypothetical question. Courts in several cases have rejected free
speech arguments and upheld private land-use restrictions against signs. See, e.g., Tansey-Wamer,
Inc. v. E. Coast Resorts, Inc., 1978 Del. Ch. LEXIS 688, at *9 (Del. Ch. Nov. 27, 1978) (sign
prohibition in condo did not violate free speech rights); Knolls Ass'n. v. Hinton, 389 N.E.2d 693,
697 (111.
App. Ct. 1979) (enforcing a sign prohibition); Murphy v. Timber Trace Ass'n., 779 S.W.2d
603, 609 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (rejecting a free speech challenge against restriction on for sale
signs); and Harrison v. Tucker, 342 S.W.2d 383, 384 (Tex. Ct. App. 1961) (enforcing sign
prohibition but dissolving racially restrictive covenants). In states that do not require State action to
trigger free speech rights, however, courts may decline to enforce of CC&Rs restricting signs, and
they have done so in at least one case. See, e.g., Mazdabrook Commons Homeowners' Ass'n. v.
Khan, 46 A.3d 507, 522 (N.J. 2012).
162. See, e.g., City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 58 (1994).
163. This is not a hypothetical question either. See, e.g., Angela C. Carmella, Religion-Free
Environments in Common Interest Communities, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 57, 57-59 (2010). As Professor

Carmella explains, both the U.S. Department of Justice and the U.S. Department of Housing and
Urban Development interpret religion-free environments to be in violation of the Fair Housing Act,
but the only court to have considered the matter did not. See Savanna Club Worship Serv. v.
Savanna Club Homeowners' Ass'n., 456 F. Supp. 2d 1223, 1234 (S.D. Fla. 2005) (religious-free
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suppose the restriction prevents a Christian prayer group from meeting,
but allows a yoga club to meet and engage in meditation. If a public
ordinance prohibited a religious group from gathering to pray in a public
park, but allowed another group to meet and engage in meditation in the
same place, it would violate the freedom of religion clause in the First
Amendment. 164 It would also clearly undermine liberty, since the State's
coercive powers would be used to prevent a group from praying while
allowing another group to engage in meditation, a very similar activity.
If a court enforced a private land-use restriction against religious groups
meeting to pray in the common area of a residential development but
allowed other groups to use the area for meditation, it would be using the
State's coercive powers to suppress religious freedom just as much as it
would if it was enforcing a public ordinance.
If liberty is to provide the compass governing the use of State
power, then courts should be restrained in the enforcement of private
land-use restrictions in all the ways that government is restrained in
enforcing public land-use restrictions. In other words, all of the
constitutional constraints that apply against public land-use restrictions
should also apply against courts' enforcement of private land-use
restrictions. In an ideal world, the constraints would be applied under a
more liberal application of the State action doctrine, one that recognized
the judiciary as a branch of government and the courts as State actors. 165
Since constitutional doctrines evolve slowly, that is unlikely to happen
anytime soon. It might be more efficacious for legislatures to apply all
federal and state constitutional constraints to private land-use restrictions
as a matter of statutory law, although that is not likely to happen anytime
soon either. 66 Ultimately, if legislatures fail to act, courts should apply
common space was not discriminatory since all religions were treated the same).
164. See JOHN B. ATTANASIO & JOEL K. GOLDSTEIN, UNDERSTANDING CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 654-55 (4th ed. 2012). See also Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 276-77 (1981) (a public

university cannot exclude student religious groups from access to university facilities if it provide
such access to other student groups).
165. Not all critics of private land-use restrictions against religious gatherings agree that this
would be the best approach. Carmella, supra note 163, at 95-98, for example, worries that
constitutional norms might actually undermine the rights of religious groups to use common areas in
common interest communities. The concern here is neither to promote nor suppress the rights of
religious groups but to advance liberty. Shelley Ross Saxer, Shelley v. Kraemer's Fiftieth
Anniversary: "A Time Jbr Keeping; a Time for Throwing Away?", 47 KAN. L. REV. 61, 64-65

(1998) opposes applying the State action doctrine in private law cases on the grounds that it might
actually undermine liberty. She worries, for example, that residents may not be able to enforce
restrictions against an adult book store because it would be protected by the First Amendment.
166. Some states have already applied some particular constitutional protections through state
statutes. Nonetheless, they have not done so coherently and pervasively and they are not likely to do
so anytime soon. See Amanda Hopkins, Article, What's Wrong with My Nativity Scene?:
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the constraints themselves through new holdings that make private landuse restrictions unenforceable as a matter of public policy 67whenever they
would be unconstitutional as public land-use restrictions.'
IV. LIBERTY OF CONTRACT

This section focuses on the relationships between liberty and
specific contract law doctrine. It uses examples from the parol evidence
rule, the unconscionability doctrine, and the impracticability doctrine to
illustrate the ways in which contract doctrines may advance or
undermine liberty, depending on whether the doctrines are appropriately
constructed and applied. It also raises concerns about the ways in which
contract law may systematically undermine liberty, using as an example
the practices of some State-sponsored, non-profit corporations that use
lifestyle covenants and morals clauses in their employment contracts to
intrude into their employees' spheres of personal autonomy and privacy.
Corporations may require employees to sign lifestyle covenants or
morals clauses as a condition of employment; they may subsequently
discharge the employees for violating the covenants or clauses. Since the
lifestyle covenants and morals clauses may intrude into the employees'
spheres of personal autonomy and privacy, the fear or fact of being
discharged for violating a lifestyle covenant or morals clause might
impinge on the employees' liberty. Moreover, prospective employees
might be excluded from a significant segment of the labor market if they
cannot, in conscience, sign a lifestyle covenant or morals clause that is
inconsistent with their own lifestyle and values.
Since the rights and privileges accorded to corporations by the State
no doubt contribute to their economic success and power in labor
markets, the State is complicit in the intrusion into the liberty of their
employees and prospective employees.1 68 The State's complicity is the
greatest when the employer is a non-profit corporation because nonprofit corporations receive significantly more rights and privileges from
the State than for-profit corporations and because
they are not
69
disciplined as rigorously by market competition.
This Article argues, therefore, that 1) subject to an appropriately
Religiously DiscriminatoryRestrictive Covenants in New York, 13 RUTGERS J. L. & RELIGION 415,

421-22 (2012).
167. Carmella, supra note 163, at 103-09 endorses courts' use of public policy to void
restrictions against religious gatherings. Saxer, supra note 165, at 70 also supports the public policy
approach.
168.
169.

See infra Part IV.C.
See infra Part 1V.C.
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defined ministerial exception, 170 non-profit corporations that benefit
from significant tax exemptions should be prohibited under federal and
state tax laws and/or regulations from requiring or even requesting
employees to sign lifestyle covenants or morals clauses, 2) any
employees they discharge for lifestyle or personal moral choices should
be able to seek a remedy against them under state wrongful-discharge
statutes, or 3) if the remedy is not provided under state statutes, it should
be provided through the courts' expansion in the scope of the public
policy exception to the employment-at-will rule in employment law. 7 '
Part IV.A will discuss the freedom of contract and Part IV.B will
discuss some of the limitations to this freedom, focusing on the parol
evidence rule, the unconscionability doctrine, and the impracticability
doctrine. Finally, Part IV.C will discuss the ways in which the use of
lifestyle clauses and morals clauses by some State-sponsored, non-profit
corporations in their employment contracts intrudes into their
employees' spheres of personal autonomy and privacy and it suggests
ways in which the problems could be mitigated through federal and state
statutes, as well through court decisions which expand the scope of
wrongful-discharge laws.
A. The Freedom of Contract
The term "freedom of contract"-or "liberty of contract"--is often
associated with an argument that the government's right to regulate
private markets is or should be constrained by the due process clause of
the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 72 But the term
is also often used in a more general sense to refer to the respect for the
autonomy of the parties to a contract to decide for themselves what the
rules governing their agreement should be.' 73 Scholars have sometimes
used this broader meaning of the term in critiquing contract doctrines or
courts' contract decisions that they believe frustrate the intentions of the
170.
171.

See infra Part IV.C.
See infra Part IV.C.

172.

See, e.g.,

DAVID N. MAYER, LIBERTY OF CONTRACT: REDISCOVERING

A LOST

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 1-2 (2011).
173. HAYEK, supra note 7, at 230-31, BARNETT, supra note 9, at 77-82, and Epstein, supra
note 149, at 1354, 1368. This is, in fact, a basic principle of contract law in the United States and
most other developed nations. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-302 (1977) (Variation by Agreement section of
the Uniform Commercial Code); U.N. COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, UNITED
NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS, at 3, U.N. Sales

No. E. I0.V. 14 (Article 6 of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale
of Goods states: "The parties may exclude the application of this Convention or, subject to article
12, derogate from or vary the effect of any of its provisions.").
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parties and, in effect, alter the terms of the parties' agreements. 114
There are often excellent reasons to raise concerns about
government regulations in private markets, but the main purpose of this
section is to focus on the role that State coercion plays in enforcing
private contractual obligations. Since courts exercise coercion whenever
they enforce contractual obligations, this raises the question: Why
should they do so? The best answer is that the parties impliedly agree to
subject themselves to that form of State coercion when they execute
their contract. 175 In other words, it is their intention and will to bind
themselves to their agreement by deferring to the State's authority to use
its coercive powers to enforce the terms, should enforcement be
necessary. 176 By binding themselves to their agreement, the parties are
able to enjoy even greater freedom, since they can thus trade their
private property and other rights in return for private property and rights
of others that are of greater value to them. 177
There is considerable commentary and debate about the ways in
which some courts have construed and applied contract doctrines. One
common concern, particularly among scholars who take a formalist
approach to contracts, is that overly broad or loose interpretations of
some contract doctrines might frustrate the intentions of the parties to an
agreement; another concern is that it might increase the transaction costs
of contracting parties regardless of whether they ever have any kind of
dispute.17 8 In keeping with the focus of the Article, this Part focuses
instead on the ways in which some important contract doctrines may
advance or impede liberty. As the 79discussion below will elaborate, the
matter may be somewhat nuanced. 1
174.
EPSTEIN, supra note 36, at 120-21 describes this view as the classical synthesis.
Interestingly, HAYEK, supra note 7, at 230-31 argues that the issue is not what contracts the State
will allow, but which ones they will enforce.
175.
See, e.g., BARNETT, supra note 9, at 53-57 for Randy Barnett's discussion of consensual
transfers.
176. Id.
177. As Friedrich Hayek observed, "The rules of property and contract are required to delimit
the individual's private sphere wherever the resources or services needed for the pursuit of his aims
are scarce and must, in consequence, be under the control of some man or other," HAYEK, supra
note 7, at 141.
178. This is standard transaction cost analysis: legal uncertainty encourages parties to draft
their agreements more carefully than they otherwise would. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 124,
at 195-244.
179. Interestingly, Friedrich Hayek had few quibbles with contract doctrines. In fact, his
conception of freedom of contract was not the one that is meant today. As he wrote; "Freedom of
contract, like freedom in all other fields, really means that the permissibility of a particular act
depends only on general rules and not on its specific approval by authority." HAYEK, supra note 7,
at 230.
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B. The Limits of The Freedom of Contract
1. The Parol Evidence Rule
Most contract disputes raise questions about the appropriate
interpretation of the contract terms. 80 Disputes about contract
interpretation often raise questions about what evidence a court will
consider in interpreting the contract.1 8' Some scholars have argued that
when the parties are sophisticated and use a written instrument that
includes a merger clause to provide evidence of a carefully negotiated
and drafted agreement, courts should apply the parol evidence rule
strictly and rely on the plain meaning of the writing to interpret the
contract's terms. 182 Since it arrives at a formalist prescription using
modem neoclassical economic analysis, this line of scholarship
constitutes a neo-formalist movement in modem contract scholarship., 83
Within the sphere of its application, the logic is beyond dispute. What is
not beyond dispute, however, is whether the analysis is at all novel or
authors contend, or
surprising and whether it applies as widely as 8the
4
even widely enough to be of any practical value. 1
Indeed, the normative implications of the neo-formalist analysis are
predictable consequences of its neoclassical economic assumptions.
Given that the analysis is predicated on a model of two perfectly rational
parties, endowed with the computational abilities of high speed
computers and the wisdom of Job, the implication that courts should
respect and enforce their mutual intentions about the scope of the
evidence that might be used to interpret their contract is hardly
surprising. In fact, the main part of the analysis was anticipated by Eric
180.

George Cohen, Interpretation and Implied Terms in Contract Law, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF

CONTRACT LAW AND ECONOMICS 125, 125-26 (Gerrit de Geest ed., 2d ed. 2011).

181. As Margaret Kniffin clarifies, questions about contract interpretation and the
admissibility of extrinsic evidence are often conflated, but they are distinct. Margaret N. Kniffin,
Conflating and Confusing Contract Interpretation and the Parol Evidence Rule: Is the Emperor
WearingSomeone Else's Clothes?, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 75, 76-77 (2009).
182. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law,
113 YALE L.J. 541 (2003); Alan Schwartz & Joel Watson, The Law and Economics of Costly
Contracting,20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1 (2004); Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating
Litigation in ContractDesign, 115 YALE L.J. 814 (2006); Jody Kraus & Robert E. Scott, Contract
Design and the Structure of ContractualIntent, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1023 (2009); and Alan Schwartz
& Robert E. Scott, ContractInterpretationRedux, 119 YALE L.J. 926 (2010).
183. Alan Schwartz and Robert Scott describe the work as part of a larger project, "arguing
that the law should pursue the first order goal of maximizing contractual surplus when it chooses
rules to regulate merchant-to-merchant contracts." Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract
InterpretationRedux, 119 YALE L.J. 926, 928 (2010).
184.

See generally STEVEN J. BURTON, ELEMENTS OF CONTRACT INTERPRETATION (2009).
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Posner well before the neo-formalists addressed the matter.' 85 Moreover,
one could argue that some of the claims about the normative
implications are clearly overreaching. For example, Robert Scott and
Alan Schwartz's analysis is intended to apply only to "sophisticated"
parties, but their definition of a "sophisticated" party is any corporation
that has five or more employees. 186 It seems highly doubtful whether
even the largest corporations ever engage in the kind of sophisticated
strategizing and contract drafting that is assumed in their analysis or
would have anything close to the87computation abilities and foresight
they would need in order to do so. 1
As a practical matter, the terms of any contract, whether it covers a
complex long-term business relationship or a simple one-shot
transaction, must be negotiated and agreed upon using a language of
some kind. Unfortunately, there are inherent limitations on the use of
language. First of all, as Wittgenstein observed, there can be no such
thing as a "private" language. 88 That is to say, a language must be
shared; it cannot consist of symbols, signs, or sounds that have only
personal meanings, or meanings to only the person who uses them. 89 A
language is therefore necessarily "public" in the sense that its meanings
must be shared for the language to qualify as a medium of
communication. Unfortunately, because the meanings of any language
are also inherently personal they cannot be understood in precisely the
same way by different people. The meanings must be "shared", but they
can only be shared imperfectly since we can never be certain that they
are understood by all persons in exactly the same way. 9 0 In fact, it is not
even certain that the understandings people have of the language they
use at one time will be the same as their understandings-or even their

185. See generally Eric A. Posner, The Parol Evidence Rule, the Plain Meaning Rule, and the
Principles of Contractual Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 533 (1998).
186.
Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113
YALE L.J. 541, 545 (2003).
187. HAYEK, supra note 7, at 56-61 went to great lengths to reject the "French rationalist

tradition" of rooting economic theory in assumptions about perfectly rational behavior in favor of
the "British empirical tradition." He believed the latter was closer to the "Christian tradition of the
fallibility and sinfulness of man." Id. at 61. In that respect, his views accorded with those of the
modem day new institutional economists. See, e.g., Rudolph Richter, The Role of Law in the New
Institutional Economics, 26 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 13, 15 (2008) ("[Tihe NIE from its very
beginnings proceeded. . . by taking account of the imperfections of individual rationality and

limited foresight.").
188. Val D. Ricks, The Possibility of Plain Meaning:
Precedents, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 767, 785 (2008).

189.
190.

Wittgenstein and the Contract

Id. at 785-88.
Public language cannot reflect the parties' private thoughts. Id. at 789.
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91
recollection of their understandings-of the same language later on.'
Unfortunately, the interpretation of contractual rights and
obligations is subject to the limitations of the language that is used to
express them. Moreover, the need for interpretation implies the need for
an "interpreter."' 92 If the parties have a dispute about the interpretation
of the language of their agreement, then they obviously cannot agree on
an appropriate interpretation. And if only one of the parties is assigned
the right to interpret the language so that there is no need for them to
agree on its interpretation, that party will apply its own understanding of
the language as of that time, rather than any shared understanding
between the parties at the time of contracting. For practical purposes, the
"language" of the contract would be a private one, and, therefore, only a
language in name, and the contract would obviously not reflect any
genuine agreement of the parties, nor would the contract be subject to
"interpretation"-its terms would simply be dictated by the party with
the right to "interpret" it. Any true contract-one that reflects a mutual
agreement of the parties-must, therefore, be interpreted by a third
party. And, of course, that third party will usually be a court or private
arbiter.
Some of the most fundamental limits on the liberty of contract are
therefore inherent in the limitations of language. The terms of a contract
cannot be self-enforcing. Nor can they be self-interpreting. 193 Indeed,the
parties themselves cannot contract for the interpretation of the contract
in the contract. For one thing, if they attempt to specify how a particular
right or obligation is to be interpreted, their language will confront the
same limitations of the language used to specify the right or obligation
itself. Since the specification of how the contract is to be interpreted
would itself have to use language, and since that use of language would
be subject to all the same limitations, the parties would merely add an
additional interpretive hurdle to their dispute.' 94 Perhaps more
importantly, since there is an unavoidable need for third party
interpretation of any contract term, the notion that the parties themselves

191.
BRIAN Bix, LAW, LANGUAGE, AND LEGAL DETERMINACY 37 (1993) ("Wittgenstein ...
has shown that there is no fact of the matter to prove that I mean the same thing by my current use
of a word as I did by a former use ....
").
192. Marc A. Loth, Limits of Private Law: EnrichingLegal Dogmatics, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV.
1725, 1726 (2007) (citing Wittgenstein for the proposition that rules are not self-applying).
193. Id. at 1726.
194. Of course, this does not mean that a merger clause or other contract term bearing on the
interpretation of the contract would be of no value to a judge or arbiter; it merely means that such a
contract term could not by itself govern the interpretation of the contract.
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could contract for the interpretation of the contract is illogical. 195
Since the parties to any complex contract would have to rely on a
third party to interpret the language, they would have to specify how
their language was to be interpreted to ensure that it would be
unambiguous. But the language specifying how the language was to be
interpreted would itself have to be interpreted. The only way of avoiding
an infinite regress of clauses specifying how clauses were to be
interpreted would be by including a self-referential clause that specified
how the contract, including the clause itself, was to be interpreted. A
complete and unambiguous contract could thus only be defined by a set
of statements about the parties' rights and obligations plus an additional,
self-referential statement about how the statements were to be
interpreted. Unfortunately, self-referential systems of
rules and logic are
96
well-known to yield paradoxes and inconsistencies.'
Suppose the parties to a contract execute a written instrument, but
suppose there is also parol evidence that contradicts the writing. A court
that relies exclusively on the writing to interpret the contract would
probably rule differently than a court that relied exclusively on the parol
evidence. 197 A court that used both the writing and the parol evidence to
interpret the contract might rule either way. But suppose the parties
include in their writing a merger clause stating that the writing is a
complete and final expression of their agreement. Some courts might be
persuaded by the merger clause to exclude the parol evidence. But from
a purely theoretical perspective, and setting aside any concerns about the
reliability of the evidence,1 98 there is no reason why a court should
privilege certain kinds of language, such as the language used in writing,
over other kinds of language, such as verbal statements.
As a matter of logic, a court would need to interpret the contract to
determine whether the parties meant to exclude parol evidence before it
could exclude the parol evidence on the grounds that the contract
excluded it. 99 And there is no logical reason why the court should not
195.
196.

This is not meant to suggest that any of the neo-formalists have ever said otherwise.
There is a debate about whether Godel's Theorem implies that a complete and consistent

legal system is logically impossible. See generally Kevin W. Saunders, What Logic Can and Cannot
Tell us About Law, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 667 (1998). The point being made here is closely
related, but it does not rest on Godel's Theorem.

197. Ricks, supra note 188, at 803 ("[Tjhe meaning of contractual language might be clear
within the four comers of the document but ambiguous or different outside of that context or when
more context is added.").
198. The parol evidence rule is, after all, a rule of contract law and not a rule of evidence.
199.

Loth, supra note 192, at 1732 ("In legal theory it is an accepted proposition that the

application of law, or the identification of a legal proposition, presupposes an interpretation of the
law.").
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consider parol evidence in interpreting whether the parties intended the
contract to exclude parol evidence. 200 It is possible that the parties' oral
agreement might have contradicted a clause in the writing even though
the parties also agreed orally that the writing would be a complete and
final statement of their agreement. Of course, it would be much more
likely that if the parties' oral agreement contradicted certain terms in the
writing, it would also contradict any merger clause in the writing. Thus,
if a court did consider the parol evidence, this would likely raise some
ambiguity about the interpretation of the contract. It would at least raise
the possibility that two courts, or the same court at different times, might
reach inconsistent interpretations--especially if they applied different
versions of the parol evidence rule.20 1
The limitations of language and logic thus cast considerable doubt
on the merits of a strict parol evidence rule. But there are more practical
reasons to doubt the wisdom of a strict parol evidence rule. A strict parol
evidence rule would, in general, work to the advantage of stronger
parties and the disadvantage of weaker ones. In most cases where there
is a single written instrument, it is drafted by one party and signed by the
other. In fact, the scenario is ripe for the formation of a contract of
adhesion.202 The drafter is typically the party with more economic
resources and greater sophistication; even where both parties are
merchants, the writing may take a standard form and the weaker party
may be given a take-it-or-leave-it offer.20 3 The terms of the writing are
therefore more likely to reflect the interests of the stronger party than
those of the weaker one, and a strict parol evidence rule would therefore
work to the advantage of the stronger party at the expense of the weaker
one.
Of course, when a court enforces the terms of a written agreement it
exercises the power of State coercion. If the term that the court was
enforcing was not one that the weaker party had truly assented to, then
the State's coercive powers would, in effect, be used against the weaker
party on behalf of the stronger party. 20 4 If, on the other hand, the court
200. Id. The logic appears to have been persuasive. Thus, for example, U.C.C. § 2-202 cmt.
l(c) (2001) rejects the idea that a court needs to find a writing to be ambiguous before it will
consider parol evidence.
201. This is consistent with H.L.A. Hart's conception of the law as "open-textured" in the
sense that its rules will always be indeterminate because of the nature of language and the contexts
in which it is applied. Loth, supra note 192, at 1726.
202. See, e.g., Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesions-Some Thoughts About Freedom of
Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629 (1943) for the classic article.
203. Id. at 632.
204. As Friedrich Kessler observed, therefore, courts that are conscious of the imbalance in

20161

LIBERTY AT THE BORDERS OF PRIVATE LAW

declined to enforce an obligation of the stronger party because of "fine
print" in the written instrument that had been drafted by the stronger
party, even though both parties understood the obligation to have been
agreed upon, then the court would, in effect, facilitate a kind of
malfeasance perpetrated by the stronger party against the weaker one. 20 5
Unfortunately, the State's coercive powers would probably be used on
behalf of the powerful against the weak much more commonly than they
would be used on behalf of the weak against the powerful.2 °6
2. Unconscionability
The modem doctrine of unconscionability allows a court to void a
contract or terms of a contract on the grounds that the terms are so
unfavorable to a party that enforcing them would cause oppression and
unfair surprise.20 7 It is commonly thought to provide a way for courts to
regulate bargains. Since that sounds like interference with a market
transaction, the doctrine of unconscionability has been widely criticized
by scholars who favor liberty and free markets. 208 While the doctrine
would pose a serious threat to liberty if it was applied inappropriately,
concerns about the doctrine may have been overstated, and its virtues
may have been understated. In fact, in some cases the doctrine of
unconscionability may provide a legal justification for courts not to
allow the stronger party to an agreement to use the courts and the power
of State coercion to enforce wrongful claims against the weaker party. 02910
Unconscionability has a confounding and controversial history.

the bargaining power of the parties have gone to great lengths to interpret the parties' contracts
equitably for the weaker parties. Id. at 633.
205.

Kessler thus observed that courts might try to interpret the contract to satisfy the weaker

party's "reasonable expectations" and cited Karl Llewellyn's observation that oral evidence can
provide the basis for interpreting contracts that reflect the parties' "life situation." Id. at 637.
206.
As HAYEK, supra note 7, at 141, observed, "That other people's property can be
serviceable in the achievement of our aims is due mainly to the enforceability of contracts. The
whole network of rights created by contracts is as important a part of our own protected sphere, as

much the basis of our plans, as any property of our own." To the extent that rules of contract
interpretation favored the stronger against the weak, they might also implicate the State in helping
the stronger parties to usurp the rights of the weaker parties.
207. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (1977) ("The principle is one of the prevention of
oppression and unfair surprise.").
208. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L. &
ECON. 293 (1975).
209. See the discussion, infra this Part.
210. The history of the unconscionability doctrine is integral to the history of the development
of modem contract law. See Morton J. Horwitz, The Historical Foundations of Modern Contract
Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 917 (1974) for a discussion of the "sound price" rule and the vestiges of
equity in modem contract law.
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As the doctrine is most commonly described and applied today, it
involves a two-pronged test. 211 The first prong applies a test for

procedural abuse, which is proved by evidence of sharp dealing,
deceptive bargaining tactics, and unequal bargaining power-generally
anything that suggests there was a flaw in the bargaining process. 2 The
second prong applies a test for substantive abuse, which is proved by
evidence that the terms are so one-sided and grossly unfair that it would
be inequitable to enforce them."1 3 The two-pronged test did not actually
originate in the case law; it was actually first described in a law review
article by Arthur Leff.2 14 Leff carefully reviewed the discussions and
debates between members of the Permanent Editorial Board of the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the
American Law Institute during the drafting of Section 2-302 of the
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), but he struggled in deciding whether
to advocate a two-pronged test because it was far from clear whether the
drafters intended that procedural abuse should be required.215 He
ultimately decided that a two-pronged test would be best and that is what
he advocated.2 16
It remains doubtful whether the drafters of Article 2 intended that
the doctrine of unconscionability should entail the application of a twopronged test. As Leff documented, the drafters' discussions and debates
did not make this clear, nor do the cases cited in the Official Comments
to Section 2-302 of the UCC. 2 17 In fact, what is most remarkable about

the cases cited in the Official Comments is that none of them even
mentions the word "unconscionability" and all of them can be construed
as cases about questions of contract interpretation. 218 Indeed, there is a
fine line between regulating a contract and interpreting it, and
unconscionability cases are often, expressly or impliedly, ones about
contract interpretation.219 As Robert Hillman points out, guile at the
bargaining stage of an agreement often goes hand-in-hand with an
211.
See, e.g., CLAYTON P. GILLETTE & STEVEN D. WALT, SALES LAW: DOMESTIC AND
INTERNATIONAL 155 (1999).

212.
213.
214.

Id.
Id.
Arthur Allen Left, Unconscionabilityand the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U.

PA. L. REV. 485, 487 (1967).

215.
216.
217.
218.

Id. at 489-501.
Id. at 487.
Id. at 489-501.
Donald J. Smythe, Considerationfor a Price: Using the Contract Price to Interpret

Ambiguous Contract Terms, 34 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 109, 126-32 (2013).
219. ROBERT A. HILLMAN, THE RICHNESS OF CONTRACT LAW: AN ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE
OF CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF CONTRACT LAW 41 (1997).
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overreaching interpretation of contract terms later on.220 Many
unconscionability cases thus bear more than a superficial resemblance to
ones about contract interpretation. 221 To put this in another perspective,
one might wonder how the terms of an agreement could have been truly
bargained-for if they are so grossly unfair that it would be inequitable to
enforce them. And if they were not truly bargained-for, could they really
have been part of the agreement?
Unconscionability cases therefore raise questions about the courts'
exercise of State coercion in enforcing contractual obligations. If the
terms of a contract are unconscionable, they were arguably not truly
bargained-for, and the party against whom enforcement of the terms is
sought did not really assent to be bound by them. If a court enforced the
contract under those circumstances, it would use the State's power of
coercion to enforce a claim by the stronger party against the weaker
party, even though the weaker party did not consent to subject itself to
the State's coercive powers. Under such circumstances, a court would
arguably further liberty by using the unconscionability doctrine to void
the purported contractual obligations.
Of course, a court that applied the unconscionability doctrine in
circumstances in which the weaker party did assent to the contract terms,
and therefore did impliedly consent to the use of the State's coercive
powers to enforce the contract claim, would undermine the freedom of
the parties to commit themselves to binding agreements. The doctrine of
unconscionability, therefore, is a double-edged sword: It has an
important role to play in advancing liberty, but it can also be abused. Its
abuse, however, would not directly interfere with liberty. When a court
declines to enforce a contractual obligation it merely declines to exercise
the State's coercive powers to bind the parties to a purported agreement.
The court does not thereby exercise any coercion or even interfere with
the parties' agreement. Of course, although this does not directly
undermine liberty, it does diminish the efficacy of contract law, and the
application of the unconscionability doctrine should, therefore, be
limited to the appropriate circumstances. Nonetheless, if the primary
purpose of the State is to advance liberty, there is an important role for
the doctrine of unconscionability in modem contract law.
3. Impracticability
Sometimes, after a contract has been formed, a party seeks to be
220.
221.

Id.
See generally Smythe, supra note 218.
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excused from performance of an obligation. This has led to the
development of legal doctrines under which courts will grant parties
excuses from contractual obligations.2 2 The doctrine of impossibility
was the first excuse doctrine to emerge from the case law. Under the
doctrine of impossibility a party may be granted an excuse from the
performance of a contractual obligation if the party's performance has
become impossible.223 The classic example is one in which a party has
contracted to provide a music hall for a concert, but in between the
formation of the contract and the concert date the music hall is destroyed
in a fire.224 The second excuse doctrine to emerge from the case law was
the doctrine of frustration of purpose. Under the frustration of purpose
doctrine a party may be excused from performance of a contractual
obligation if the basic purpose of the contract has been frustrated. 225 The
classic example is one in which an apartment has been rented for a day
to view a parade, but the parade is postponed to another day,226and the
party's purpose in renting the apartment is, therefore, frustrated.
The doctrine of impracticability was the third, and arguably most
important, excuse doctrine to emerge from the cases. Under the doctrine
of impracticability a party may be excused from performance of its
contractual obligations if its performance has become impracticable, in
the sense that it would cause severe economic hardship, due to
unforeseen supervening events since the time of contracting. 227 The
classic example is one in which a party has contracted to build a bridge,
but discovers that, due to difficult soil conditions that were unknown at
the time of contracting, the construction costs will be several times
larger than expected and that building the bridge will cause the party to
suffer severe economic hardship, if not complete financial ruin.228 The
doctrine of impracticability is probably most relevant today, since it has
been adopted in Section 2-615 of the U.C.C. 229 and, arguably, also in
Article 79 of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods.230
222. See Donald J. Smythe, Bounded Rationality, the Doctrine of Impracticability, and the
Governance of Relational Contracts, 13 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 227, 227-29 (2004) for an
overview of the development of excuse doctrines.
223. Id.
224. Taylor v. Caldwell, (1863) 122 Eng. Rep. 310 (Q.B.).
225. Smythe, supra note 222, at 228.
226. Krell v. Henry, (1903) 2 K.B. 740.
227. Smythe, supra note 222, at 236-38.
228. Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard, 156 P. 458, 459 (Cal. 1916).
229. U.C.C. § 2-615 (2014) (discussing breach, repudiation, and excuse).
230. U.N. COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON
CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS, at 24-25, U.N. Sales No. E. I0.V. 14.
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The trend in the law has clearly been to grant excuses in a broader
range of circumstances, beginning with the physical impossibility of
performance and culminating in the mere economic impracticability of
performance. 231 The broadening scope of contractual excuse doctrines
has concerned some commentators who fear that parties may be able to
use them to evade contractual obligations opportunistically.2 32 This is a
legitimate concern. Nonetheless, the manner in which the concerns have
been stated may, at times, have misconstrued a court's role in
adjudicating contractual disputes. For example, some scholars have
criticized courts for interfering with the allocation of parties' risks when
they grant contractual excuses. 233
Strictly speaking, even if courts misapply excuse doctrines and
allow them to be used opportunistically, they do not interfere with the
risk allocations in the parties' agreements. In fact, if anything at all, they
merely decline to enforce the risk allocations. There is an important
difference between a court using its coercive powers to change the risk
allocations in an agreement and a court declining to use its coercive
powers to bind parties to an agreement. In the former case, the court
would undermine liberty because it would use the power of State
coercion against a party's will; in the latter case the court would not use
the power of State coercion at all. Moreover, it would be a mistake to
presume that courts have run amuck and granted too many excuses when
they should not have done so.234
One of the overarching principles of modern contract law is the
principle of party autonomy. 233 The parties to a contract are free to
231.

Smythe, supra note 222, at 228.

232.
See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette, Commercial Rationality and the Duty to Adjust Long-Term
Contracts, 69 MINN. L. REV. 521 (1985); Alan 0. Sykes, The Doctrine of Commercial
Impracticability in a Second-Best World, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 43 (1990); and George G. Triantis,
Contractual Allocations of Unknown Risks: A Critique of the Doctrine of Commercial
Impracticability, 42 U. TORONTO L.J. 450 (1992).
233.
See generally Gillette, supra note 232; Sykes, supra note 232; and Triantis, supra note
232. See also Robert E. Scott, Conflict and Cooperation in Long-Term Contracts, 75 CAL. L. REV.
2005 (1987).

234. Robert Scott observed, "The most curious aspect of the commercial impracticability cases
decided over the past 20 years has been the courts' steadfast refusal to grant excuse for
nonperformance despite the apparent invitation to do so in the Uniform Commercial Code and the
Second Restatement." Scott, supra note 233, at 2006 n. 1.
235.

The principle is reflected, for example, in U.C.C. §

1-302 (1977)

(Variation By

Agreement section of the Uniform Commercial Code) as well as the United Nations Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Article 6. U.N. COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL
TRADE LAW, UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF

GOODS, at 3, U.N. Sales No. E.10.V.14 ("The parties may exclude the application of this
Convention or, subject to article 12, derogate from or vary the effect of any of its provisions.").
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contract around any of the default rules that will apply to their
agreement, except for certain basic rules, such as the doctrine of good
faith or fair dealing requirements.2 36 This means that almost all contract
rules and doctrines can be waived or modified by express agreement. As
Randy Barnett observed, the parties to a contract impliedly agree to all
the rules and doctrines that courts will apply to adjudicate any disputes
unless they expressly waive or modify them under the terms of their
bargain. 237 That includes any excuse doctrines that might apply to the
parties' contract, either under a case precedent or a statute. 238 Thus, if
courts do apply the doctrine of impracticability and grant an excuse, it is
impliedly under the terms of the parties' bargain. 239 Even if courts

inadvertently apply an excuse doctrine when they should not, that is a
risk the parties will have bargained-for; in other words, courts do not
thereby disturb the allocation of risks in the parties' agreements.
Perhaps even more importantly, one might doubt whether courts do
commonly misapply excuse doctrines. The doctrine of impracticability,
for example, is normally applied using a two-pronged test. 240 Although
the cases do not apply the test consistently, under the most persuasive
interpretation of the test, courts will grant an excuse only if the
circumstances giving rise to the impracticability claim were reasonably
unforeseen at the time of contracting and if the party under the
obligation would be subjected to severe economic hardship if required to
perform.24 ' It seems implausible that any party could have truly agreed
to perform an obligation under circumstances that were not reasonably
foreseeable and if performing the obligation would cause such a severe
hardship, especially if the parties did not expressly waive the application
of the impracticability doctrine. If a court failed to grant an excuse and
compelled the party's performance, it would thus exercise the power of
State coercion to force the party to engage in a performance it did not
truly assent to. In other words, it would force the party to perform
against its will. The State's power of coercion would, in effect, be used
to provide a contractual right that was not truly bargained-for to one
party at the expense of the other party.
236. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-302(b) (1977) ("The obligations of good faith, diligence,
reasonableness, and care prescribed by [the Uniform Commercial Code] may not be disclaimed by
agreement.") (emphasis added).
237. Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and ContractualConsent, 78 VA.
L. REV. 821, 864-65 (1992).
238. Smythe, supranote 222, at 264.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 236.
241.
Id.
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Excuse doctrines are thus also a double-edged sword: If they are
applied inappropriately they facilitate opportunism by a party seeking to
evade an obligation it had agreed to perform; if they are not applied
when they should be, and the party seeking an excuse is forced to
perform, then the court uses the State's power of coercion against that
party's will. If the primary purpose of the State is to protect liberty, then
there is also an important role for the doctrine of impracticability in
modem contract law.
C. Lifestyle Covenants and Morals Clauses
To earn a living in a modem industrial economy most people have
little alternative but to sell their labor services to an employer. The terms
and conditions of employment contracts therefore influence the
freedoms and opportunities that most individuals enjoy. Unfortunately,
employment contracts sometimes impinge on employees' personal
autonomy. Some employers, for example, require employees to sign
lifestyle covenants or morals clauses,242 which may proscribe or require
certain lifestyle choices or moral decisions that are not directly related to
the duties of the employee's job.243 Some colleges and universities also
require that new students as well as employees sign similar lifestyle
covenants.2 44 Lifestyle covenants and morals clauses raise difficult
questions about the role of contract law in employment relationships and
the importance of respecting individuals' autonomy and privacy.
242. The systematic use of lifestyle covenants and morals clauses dates at least to the middle
of the twentieth century. Indeed, some important cases arose during the McCarthy era, when film
directors, writers, and actors were alleged to have violated morals clauses through their political
associations. See, e.g., Scott v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 240 F.2d 87, 87-88 (9th Cir. 1957);
Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Lardner, 216 F.2d 844, 847-48 (9th Cir. 1954); and Loew's,
Inc. v. Cole, 185 F.2d 641, 644-45 (9th Cir. 1950).
243. For some recent examples, see, Dustin Siggins, Catholic Archdiocese Expands Morality
Clausefor School Employees After Losing Lawsuit, LIFESITENEWS.COM (Mar. 10, 2014, 2:47 PM),
http://www.lifesitenews.com/news/catholic-archdiocese-expands-morality-clause-for-schoolemployees-after-los; Jessica Martinez, Attorneys of lnd. Teacher FiredFrom CatholicSchoolJbr In
Vitro ProcedureArgue Church Doctrine Is Irrelevantin Lawsuit, THE CHRISTIAN POST: CHURCH &

MINISTRY (Feb. 7, 2014, 4:01 PM), http://www.christianpost.com/news/attomeys-of-ind-teacherfired-from-catholic-school-for-in-vitro-procedure-argue-church-doctrine-is-irrelevant-in-awsuit114195/; and Rebecca S. Green, Jury Sides with Fired Teacher, THE JOURNAL GAZETTE (Dec. 20,

2014, 1:03 AM), http://www.journalgazette.net/news/local/courts/Jury-sides-with-fired-teacher4094706.
244. For an example of a case in Canada that has recently raised a controversy about whether a
new law school that requires students and employees to sign lifestyle covenants should be approved,
see Andrea Woo, Lawyers File Challenge Over B.C. 's Approval of Trinity Western Law School,
GLOBE AND MAIL (Nov. 3, 2014, 9:51 PM), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/british-

columbia/lawsuit-filed-against-bc-govemment-over-trinity-westem-approval/artice21435054/.

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[49:01

For example, suppose a Roman Catholic school requires all
employees to sign a morals clause, regardless of whether their duties
include any responsibility for teaching Catholic doctrine or participating
in any Catholic services.24 5 Suppose an employee who teaches languages
and who has no responsibilities related to Catholic teachings or services
is discharged from her job for using in vitro fertilization to become
pregnant, thus violating the morals clause in her contract. Suppose her
discharge did not give her any causes of action against her employer
under any federal or state laws. Although one might sympathize with her
for losing her job, under the employment-at-will rule that prevails in
United States employment law, and given that an exception might not
apply, she might be left with no legal recourse against her employer. 246
Cases such as this are complicated because they raise questions
about the scope of the employers' religious freedoms as well as the
discharged employees' autonomy. Religious organizations have been
exempted to some extent from anti-discrimination laws that might
protect their employees from encroachments on their autonomy under
the "ministerial exception. '' 24 ' The ministerial exception protects
religious organizations' freedom of religion and association by
exempting them from the reach of any laws that would prevent them
from using religious criteria in selecting or discharging their religious
leaders.248 But employees who are not ministers are still often required
to sign lifestyle covenants and morals clauses as part of the terms of
their employment. 249 And the termination of an employee for violation

245. See, e.g., Martinez, supra note 243.
246. At the time of writing, this is still unclear. In the case that motivated this example the
employee won a judgment at trial for her employer's violation of a federal gender discrimination
statute, but the employer is still seeking to have the judgment overturned. See Associated Press,
Fired Teacher Asks Judge to Reject Request to Reject Verdict, CNSNEWS.COM (Jan. 21, 2015, 8:06
PM), http://cnsnews.com/news/article/fired-teacher-asks-judge-reject-request-reject-verdict.
247. The ministerial exception arises as a matter of constitutional law; it is not a statutory
exception. See Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc'y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 944 (9th Cir. 1999).
248. See E.E.O.C. v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, N.C., 213 F.3d 795, 801 (4th Cir.
2000) (where no spiritual function is involved, the First Amendment does not stay the application of
a generally applicable law); Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch. v. E.E.O.C., 132
S.Ct. 694, 697-98 (2012) ("called" teachers, as opposed to "lay" teachers, are "ministers" within
the ministerial exception); and Dias v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, No. I I-CV-00251, 2012 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 43240, at *17 (S.D. Ohio, Mar. 29, 2012) (plaintiffs mere association with a religious
school is insufficient to make her a minister and subject her to the ministerial exception).
249. In many cases, the employees are not even members of the religion. For a discussion
about Catholic schools requiring teachers to sign morals clauses that require adherence to Catholic
doctrine, see Sandhya Dirks, Morals Clauses Prove Controversial For Catholic School Teachers,
NPR (July 15, 2014, 4:58 PM), http://www.npr.org/2014/07/15/331751394/morals-clauses-provecontroversial-for-catholic-school-teachers.
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of a lifestyle covenant or morals clause might not give rise to any cause
of action under an anti-discrimination statute or other law, even though
the discharge might impinge upon rights and privileges within the
employee's sphere of personal autonomy and privacy.250
Nonetheless, lifestyle covenants and morals clauses do not in and of
themselves involve the exercise of coercion. When an employer requires
an employee to sign a lifestyle covenant or morals clause, there is
generally no direct exercise of coercion, either by the employer or the
State. There is no exercise of coercion by the employer or the State when
an employer discharges an employee for the employee's lifestyle choices
or moral decisions either. Under the employment-at-will doctrine,
employers have a right to discharge employees for any cause, or even no
cause at all, 25 1 and courts only exercise State coercion directly when they
enforce private legal rights. In fact, if a court awarded damages to the
employee for wrongful discharge, it would be using the power of State
coercion against the employer on behalf of the employee. But the issue
is more complicated than that, and an employee's liberty is implicated
even though there is no direct exercise of coercion by the employer or
the State.
Lifestyle covenants and morals clauses are a market phenomenon,
like any other. Perhaps the important questions are: Why does the
employer bargain for them? And why would the employee agree to
them? The answers are easy. In the example above, the Catholic school
probably bargains for a morals clause that forbids employees from using
in vitro fertilization because in vitro fertilization would violate Catholic
doctrine. 5 2 And the employee probably agrees to the restriction because
she needs the job or the job pays better than the alternatives and it is
worth it to her to sacrifice some of her autonomy by signing the
clause.253 In fact, there are many reasons why an employee might not
care about such a restriction: She might agree with Catholic doctrine and
want to adhere to it as far as possible in her personal life, she might be
beyond child bearing years, or she simply might not anticipate that it
would ever bind her personal choices. But there might also be cases in
which an employee does care about the restriction and agrees to it,
250. See, e.g., the McCarthy era cases cited, supra note 242.
251. Payne v. W. & Atl. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 517-18 (Tenn. 1884) (overruled on other
grounds). Hutton v. Watters, 179 S.W. 134, 135 (Tenn. 1915) (employers may discharge or retain
employees at-will for good cause or for no cause or even for bad cause without thereby being guilty
of an unlawful act per se).
252. See, e.g., Dirks, supra note 249.
253. According to Dirks, eighteen percent of the teachers at one Catholic high school who
were required to sign a morals clause were not even Catholic. Id.
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nonetheless, because she wants the job. Presumably, if an employee does
actually violate a morals clause then the clause is either one she would
rather not have been bound to when she contracted with her employer or
it became one that she did not want to remain bound to sometime after
she became an employee.
Lifestyle covenants and morals clauses provide ways for employers
to control their employees' lifestyle choices and moral decisions about
matters that bear no relation to the employee's work duties. Outside the
scope of a narrowly defined ministerial exception, the idea that an
individual's lifestyle choices and moral decisions can be controlled by
her employer should grate on the conscience of any serious advocate for
liberty. Although the employer might not exercise any direct physical
coercion over the employee, the use of a contract clause to control her
behavior subjects the employee's lifestyle and moral decisions to a kind
of economic coercion.2 54 Given most employees' dependence on their
jobs for income, the threat of termination operates through the fear of
deprivation and want. And while it is true that prospective employees are
clauses, they lose gainful
not forced to sign the covenants and
2 55
not.
do
they
if
opportunities
employment
Of course, the law offers some protections. In addition to
protections under antidiscrimination statutes, 256 it is possible, for
example, that the morals clauses could, at times, be unconscionable. In
employment contracts, the employer often has a preponderance of
bargaining power since the employee typically has fewer employment
options than the employer has potential employees to choose among; the
employer also typically has considerably more legal sophistication and

254. EPSTEIN, supra note 32, at 47 observes that the concentration of market power itself can
seem coercive, even though no force or fraud are actually involved. In cases where market power
helps gain acceptance to contract clauses that intrude into individuals' spheres of personal autonomy
and privacy, the concerns should be greater.
255. Recall that HAYEK, supra note 7, at 20-21 defined coercion to mean "such control of the
environment or circumstances of a person by another that, in order to avoid great evil, he is forced
to act not according to a coherent plan of his own but to serve the ends of another."
256. Several courts have held that federal and/or state anti-discrimination statutes applied in
cases where employees were terminated for violating lifestyle or morals clauses. See, e.g., Vigars v.
Valley Christian Ctr. of Dublin, Cal., 805 F. Supp. 802, 806 (N.D. Cal. 1992); Cline v. Catholic
Diocese of Toledo, 206 F.3d 651, 668 (6th Cir. 1999); and Dias v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, No.
1:1 l-CV-00251, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43240, at *24 (S.D. Ohio, Mar. 29, 2012). In some cases,
however, anti-discrimination statutes have not protected discharged employees. See, e.g., Nader v.
ABC Television, Inc., 150 F. App'x 54, 56 (2d Cir. 2005); Arbor Leasing, LLC v. BTMU Capital
Corp., No. 603151/2006, 2014 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 138, at *5-6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 14, 2014); and
Galaviz v. Post-Newsweek Stations, No. SA-08-CA-305, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59603, at *21-24
(W.D. Tex. July 13, 2009).
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But it seems
normally drafts the lifestyle covenant or morals clause.
doubtful whether many lifestyle covenants or morals clauses are truly
unconscionable. Employers who require their employees to sign the
clauses typically want the employees to be fully aware of the
restrictions. If a lifestyle covenant or morals clause is not
unconscionable-if it is, in fact, truly bargained-for-then it would seem
to be within the parties' freedom of contract. And, in any case, under the
employment-at-will rule, an employer may usually discharge employees
for any cause or for no cause at all, which presumably includes lifestyle
choices and moral decisions. 258 Indeed, the employment-at-will rule
itself is within the parties' freedom of contract.
In contracts between individuals-meaning natural persons-and
other individuals, the freedom of contract argument is compelling. One
of the rights within the sphere of personal autonomy and privacy that
individuals should enjoy is the freedom to associate with whomever they
like. A free individual, therefore, has a right to include a lifestyle
covenant or morals clause in her contracts with other free individuals.
Other free individuals, of course, have a right to choose whether or not
to bind themselves to contracts that constrain their lifestyle choices or
moral behavior. Moreover, in a well-functioning employment market the
employee might normally receive some form of consideration for the
restraints; the employer, on the other hand, might normally have to
provide some consideration in return for the restraints. 259 The market
would thus provide a disincentive against such restraints, but it would
allow them if they increased the surplus derived from the contract by
both the employer and the employee.2 6o
The market would also provide a disincentive against lifestyle and
moral restraints in contracts between for-profit corporations and
individuals. For-profit corporations are created under state statutes, and
they enjoy rights and privileges under state and federal laws; 261 they are,
in that sense, State-sponsored entities, and the State is thus complicit in
their actions. But because they have shareholders who expect a return on

257.

Kessler, supra note 202, at 63 1-32 observed that standardized contracting practices have

diffused into labor markets and that they are typically "used by enterprises with strong bargaining
power."
258.

Payne v. W. & Atl. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 517-18.

259. Thus, free market economists and libertarian scholars have often placed their confidence
in the freedom of contract and the discipline of the market. For a classic statement of the argument
that the market disciplines and discourages parties from basing their decisions on non-economic
considerations see MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 108-19 (2002).

260.

Id.

261.

KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 54, at 34.
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investment, they are ultimately subject to the discipline of the market. a62
A for-profit corporation that pays a premium to employees for signing
lifestyle covenants and morals clauses would normally do so only if this
was expected to increase profits or if the shareholders, as a group, were
willing to sacrifice some of the profits in return for the corporation's
pursuit of non-economic objectives. A well-functioning market might
thus provide a disincentive against the lifestyle restraints, and one would
expect to observe them only if they increased surplus for both the
shareholders and the employees.2 63
It is not surprising, therefore, that for-profit corporations rarely
require their employees to sign lifestyle covenants or morals clauses and
rarely discharge employees for their lifestyle choices and moral
behavior. 264 If they do discharge employees for their lifestyle choices or
moral behavior, they might in fact pay a significant price, especially if
the case receives much adverse publicity. 265 In the years to come, the
public's increasing awareness of the issues, the pervasive and growing
respect for personal autonomy and freedom, and the dramatic
advancements in the dissemination of news through modem social
media will probably provide stronger disincentives against discharges of
employees for their lifestyle choices and moral behavior, at least by forprofit corporations.2 66 Social disapprobation and the discipline of the
market may thus be sufficient to protect individuals' personal autonomy
against encroachments by for-profit corporations. In any case, for-profit
corporations do not provide the greatest threat to employees' liberty.
The greatest threat to employees' liberty comes from non-profit
262.

FRIEDMAN, supra note 259, at 108-19.

263. 1d.
264. In the for-profit sector, lifestyle covenants and morals clauses are probably most common
today in entertainment industries such as television, film, and professional sports. Of course, these
are all industries in which personal images and reputations can significantly affect profits. For a
discussion of the role of morals clauses in the sports and entertainment industries, see Fernando M.
Pinguelo & Timothy D. Cedrone, Morals? Who Cares About Morals? An Examination of Morals
Clauses in Talent Contractsand What Talent Needs to Know, 19 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L.

347 (2009). As a general matter, the employees subject to lifestyle covenants and morals clauses in
these industries-often actors and athletes-are also subject to the discipline of the market through

their right of publicity and their prospects of losing valuable future advertising endorsements. See
DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 76, at 83-90.

265. Of course, as the McCarthy era cases, supra note 242, illustrate, that is not always the
case. In fact, the truth is that for-profit employers might risk losing profits for not terminating
employees who make lifestyle choices or moral decisions that violate widely accepted social norms.
266. Market discipline ultimately operates through the values and choices of individual
producers and consumers. Thus, if consumers expressly or implicitly boycott employers who
intrude into their employees' autonomy and privacy or terminate employees for their lifestyle or
moral decisions, for-profit employers who continue to do so will lose their market shares.
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corporations. Indeed, many of the employers who require employees to
sign lifestyle covenants or morals clauses are religious ones, often
schools, colleges, or universities. They are generally organized as nonprofit corporations under state statutes and benefit from significant rights
and privileges under both federal and state law.2 67 For example, they
generally do not pay corporate income taxes or property taxes, 268 even
though they clearly benefit from the State's protection of their property
rights as much as individuals and for-profit corporations. In fact, since
they do not pay taxes even though they receive direct government
subsidies and services, they are implicitly subsidized by other
taxpayers.2 69
Because they generally receive implicit tax subsidies, and because
they are not formed to earn profits, non-profit corporations are not
subject to the same degree of discipline by the market as for-profit
corporations.2 70 It is not surprising therefore that they appear to use
employment contracts to regulate their employees' lifestyle choices and
moral decisions more commonly than for-profit corporations.27 1 One of
the ironies is that they receive an implicit tax subsidy from the
employees whose lifestyle choices and moral decisions they may seek to
control. Indeed, some of their economic and market power no doubt
derives from their tax subsidies since they would almost certainly have
fewer financial resources and less market power if they were required to
pay income taxes, property taxes, and sales taxes and compete on an
equal footing in the marketplace with for-profit corporations.27 2 The
rights and privileges conferred upon them by the State thus help to
maintain the economic power that they may then use to control their
employees' lifestyle and moral decisions.
This Article presumes that a sphere of personal autonomy and
privacy is essential to liberty. Indeed, intrusions into individuals'
267. For a complete description of the subsidies as well as an attempt to quantify them, see
Ryan T. Cragun, Stephanie Yeager & Desmond Vega, How Secular Humanists (andEveryone Else)
Subsidize Religion in the United States, 32 FREE INQUIRY 39 (2012).

268. They also receive significant tax-deductible personal donations and benefit from direct
subsidies such as those under the federal government's Faith-Based Initiatives. Id. at 41.
269. Id.
270. It is worth noting that the economic power they derive from their subsidies may also
augment their political power and influence. Id. at 45.
271.

See, e.g., Siggins, supra note 243; Martinez, supra note 243; and Green, supra note 243.

272. A conservative estimate of the total subsidy to religious organizations in the United
States calculates it at about forty percent of the total subsidy to agriculture. Cragun et al., supra note
267, at 43. Of course, this is the total subsidy to all religious organizations and not just those that
provide schooling or health services and hire significant numbers of non-clerical employees. It

nonetheless offers a useful perspective.
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autonomy to decide matters as private as whom they engage in sexual
relationships with, whether to use birth control or assisted reproductive
technologies, and whether to have an abortion, impinge upon some of
their most basic human dignities. There are well-established protections
under the United States and state constitutions as well as federal and
state statutes against State intrusions into the sphere of individuals'
autonomy and privacy, but liberty is also compromised when Statesponsored entities that receive significant tax subsidies are able to use
their financial resources and economic power to control their employees'
lifestyle choices and moral behavior, especially when the choices and
behavior have no relationship to the employees' job responsibilities.
Liberty would be advanced, therefore, if non-profit corporations were
constrained from intruding into their employees' autonomy and privacy
in the same ways that the State is constrained from intruding under the
U.S and state constitutions.
There are several practical ways in which non-profit corporations
could be constrained from intruding into their employees' liberty: 1)
since they are generally created under state statutes, they could be
constrained through the statutes under which they are created; 2) they
could be regulated under the federal and state tax laws-for example,
federal tax laws could be revised to preclude non-profit corporations
from qualifying as public charities and receiving federal income tax
exemptions if they required employees to sign lifestyle covenants or
morals clauses; and 3) courts could constrain them by expanding the
scope of wrongful-discharge laws. This could be accomplished by
narrowing the ministerial exception that may exempt religious
organizations from lawsuits under anti-discrimination statutes and by
broadening the public policy exception to the employment-at-will rule so
that a nonprofit corporation that receives tax exemptions as a public
charity could be sued for discharging an employee for violating a
lifestyle covenant or morals clause or for making a lifestyle choice or
engaging in moral behavior that would be protected by the United States
or state constitutions against intrusions by the State.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article has explored the relationship between private law and
liberty. To that end, it has defined liberty to require that individuals be as
free as possible from the exercise of coercion by others, including the
State, except to the extent that they have truly and voluntarily assented
to the coercion, and that individuals have a sphere of personal autonomy
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and privacy within which they are free from intrusions by the State and
others to think what they will, say what they want, associate with
whomever they like, and be whoever they are. This sphere of personal
autonomy and privacy may be thought of as being similar to the rights
and privileges accorded to individuals against the State under the United
States and state constitutions, although in an ideal world those rights and
privileges would arguably be defined even more broadly.
There are many important ways in which private law doctrines may
advance liberty. For example, common law courts have developed and
refined doctrines, such as the first in time rule, the finders rule, and the
rule for adverse possession in property, or the parol evidence rule, the
doctrine of impracticability, and the doctrine of unconscionability in
contracts, that appear to advance liberty by limiting the exercise of
coercion by individuals against other individuals directly or by
individuals against other individuals indirectly using the power of the
State. Indeed, it may have been largely through the spontaneous order of
the common law that individuals in common law nations have enjoyed
the liberty that has enabled them to. experiment, innovate, muse, and
reflect, thus spawning intellectual advancement, material progress, and
cultural refinement, not only for themselves but for others too.
Nonetheless, as social conditions and economic practices evolve,
there will always be ways in which further refinements in the law can
advance liberty. This Article has explored some of the important ways in
which liberty in the United States could be advanced by refining the
system of private legal rights. It has focused in particular on problems
that have wide and increasing importance for many people across most
states: the impingement on individuals' liberty caused by the
enforcement of some private land-use restrictions, and the intrusion into
employees' personal autonomy and privacy wrought by the lifestyle
covenants and morals clauses in the employment contracts that some
employers use and enforce. The State is always complicit in the former,
because court enforcements of private laws always involve the exercise
of the State's power of coercion. The State is not necessarily complicit
in the discharge of employees for their lifestyle or moral decisions, but it
is complicit if the employer is a State-sponsored entity, such as a nonprofit corporation that is created under state statutes and receives
significant tax exemptions that are tantamount to implicit tax subsidies.
Legislatures and courts have a responsibility to mitigate these
problems. This Article proposes some concrete options. To begin with,
liberty would be advanced if courts were restrained in the enforcement
of private land-use restrictions in all the ways that the State is restrained
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in enforcing public land-use restrictions. In other words, all of the
federal and state constitutional constraints that apply against public landuse restriction should also apply against courts' enforcement of private
land-use restrictions. In an ideal world, the constraints would be applied
under a more expansive application of the State action doctrine, one that
recognized the judiciary as a branch of government and the courts as
State actors. Since it seems unlikely that the State action doctrine is
going to be expanded any time soon, it might be more efficacious for
state legislatures to constrain courts by enacting statutes that apply all
the federal and state constitutional constraints to private land-use
restrictions as a matter of state law. In the absence of action by state
legislatures, state courts themselves could adopt new holdings that
would make private land-use restrictions unenforceable as a matter of
public policy whenever they would be unconstitutional as public landuse restrictions.
There are several practical ways in which State-sponsored nonprofit corporations could be constrained from invading their employees'
liberty. First of all, they could be constrained through the statutes under
which they are created. They could also be constrained through revisions
to the federal and state tax laws that would preclude them from
qualifying as public charities and thus receiving tax exemptions if they
required employees to sign lifestyle covenants or morals clauses, or if
they discharged employees for lifestyle choices or moral behavior. If
legislatures failed to act, courts could constrain them by narrowing the
ministerial exception that often exempts religious non-profit
corporations from lawsuits under anti-discrimination statutes, and by
broadening the public policy exception to the employment-at-will rule so
that a nonprofit corporation that receives tax exemptions as a public
charity could be sued for discharging an employee for making lifestyle
choices or engaging in moral behavior that would be protected by the
United States or state constitutions against intrusions by the State.
The advancement of liberty is the most fundamental purpose of the
State. History has taught us that governments cannot engineer social
progress or material welfare, but it has also taught us that if people are
given the liberty to do what they will, think and act as they like, and live
their lives as freely as possible, they will thrive personally, socially and
materially. The State nonetheless plays a pivotal role in fostering
individuals' personal happiness, cultural enlightenment, and material
welfare because the power of State coercion is essential to liberty.
Unfortunately, the State may undermine liberty by failing to take the
actions necessary to protect it, or by taking actions that encroach upon it.
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The State's role in creating and enforcing private laws is no less
important to liberty than its role in creating and enforcing public laws,
and the State may undermine liberty by failing to develop and apply
private law doctrines that are necessary to advance liberty or by
enforcing private law doctrines that encroach upon it.

